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Command and control activities have long been 
recognized as a vital part of military operations.  From 
shouted battlefield commands to today’s information-age 
warfare, it is those who have mastered the techniques and 
applications of command and control who have most often 
prevailed.  As critical as it is to our success, it is a 
topic that is controversial, often poorly understood, and 
subject to wildly different interpretations. 
This thesis examines the command and control process, 
consisting of people, information, and structure, and the 
interaction between the function of command and the systems 
that facilitate the process.  It is intended to serve as a 
roadmap for the study of this topic from a foundational 
standpoint by first exploring the doctrinal definitions  
used throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) and 
developing a sense of what command and control is, and 
equally important, what it is not.  It then focuses on the 
components of the process and the dynamic relationships 
that exist between them.  Finally, it considers our future, 
as outlined by such visions as JV2020 and Network-Centric 
Warfare, in hopes of identifying and understanding those 
things that will challenge us in developing an effective 
process.  
Command and control influences every facet of warfare.   
In preparing for a future that calls for increased use of 
technology and systems, it is critical that we understand 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
 
One of the least controversial things that can be 
said about command and control is that it is 
controversial, poorly understood, and subject to 
wildly different interpretations. (Moll, 1978) 
 
Command and control (C2) activities have long been 
recognized as a vital part of military campaigns.  From 
Alexander the Great’s shouted battlefield commands to 
recent “information age engagements,” those who have 
mastered the techniques and applications of command and 
control have most often prevailed in combat. Current and 
future Department of Defense doctrine highlights the 
importance of command and control, often describing it as 
vital or critical to our success, and it is regularly 
identified as the single biggest challenge in today’s 
operating environment.  As important as it is to our 
success, it is not always a topic easily understood and it 
is often avoided completely.  The infusion of technology 
into our processes, the increasing demand for information, 
changing operational environments, and fluid organizational 
structures all contribute to the often over-looked, 
misunderstood concept of command and control. 
No single activity in war is more important than 
command and control.  Command by itself will not drive home 
a single attack against an enemy force.  It will not 
destroy a single enemy target.  Yet none of these essential 
warfighting activities, or any others, would be possible 
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without effective command and control. (MCDP 6, p. 35) 
Given the importance of the topic, it is imperative for 
warfighters to understand both the art and the science of 
command and control as part of a well-rounded professional 
military education.  Few military institutions attempt to 
educate students on this topic, and those that do, are 
often geared more towards the systems that facilitate 
command and control rather than the process critical to our 
success.  The Naval Postgraduate School, offering a course 
in Introduction to Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers and Intelligence (C4I), provides a means to 
satisfy this requirement.  A recommendation to the Command, 
Control, and Communications academic group, responsible for 
the course, to adjust the focus of the course to the 
function and process of command and control provided the 
genesis for this thesis. 
 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is the development of a 
document that addresses the central themes of command and 
control.  During the conduct of research for this project, 
course material in the form of readings, slide 
presentations, and case studies was compiled for use in a 
classroom environment.  This material is on CD-ROM and is 
available through the Command, Control, and Communications 
(C3) Academic Group.  This document is intended to provide 
the reader with an overview of topics and themes that run 
throughout the course material.    Relating those theories 
to how we conduct business today and how we envision 
operations of the future helps identify challenges we must 
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consider as we move towards a network-centric environment.  
Equally important in understanding what C2 is about, is 
gaining an appreciation for what it is not.  This document 
will serve as the road map for such an undertaking.  As 
indicated, the appendices consisting of classroom material 
will be provided in CD-ROM format.  
  
C. SCOPE 
 This thesis is directed towards mid-grade officers 
with operational experience at the tactical level. It will 
focus primarily on developing an understanding of command 
and control theories and concepts and the integration of 
systems that support them.  Doctrine, organizations, roles, 
and war-fighting philosophies of each service within the 
Department of Defense will also be discussed.  Because the 
topic is broad in scope, in-depth analysis of each module 
will not be possible; rather an understanding of the 
relevant issues relating to command and control will be the 
goal.  The intent is to expose the readers to the 
challenges, provide resources for further education, and 
prepare someone for future assignments at either the 
tactical or operational level.   
 Command and control systems and architectures although 
not covered separately, are discussed throughout the thesis 
with special emphasis placed on the challenges associated 
with them.  Course material is provided on these subjects 
and will require updating on a regular basis to keep pace 
with the rapid changes occurring in the military.  A more 
detailed study of the plethora of C2 systems is of value, 
but falls beyond the scope of this thesis.  Based upon an 
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individual’s interpretation of command and control, one 
could build an endless list of topics that are relevant to 
its study.  Documents used span the range from joint and 
service specific doctrine to individual articles with 
special emphasis paid to those dealing with tactical-level 
command and control theories and concepts.  Leadership, 
although not specifically addressed, is organic to how one 
builds effective command and control, which is covered in 
detail.   
 
D.   METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 
 As the information revolution has taken hold over the 
last thirty years, the topic of command and control has 
been extensively written about. There also exists a much 
larger set of writings that explore the technical issues 
related to command and control.  Endless amounts have been 
written about particular systems, methods of communication, 
types of software, employment tactics, and measures of 
effectiveness. (Thrasher, p.2)  Identifying relevant topics 
that capture the fundamental issues from the imposing 
amount of information available seemed a daunting task.  
Topic selection was completed after input from numerous 
sources including DoD schools, active and retired military 
officers, and faculty from NPS.  These are discussed below. 
 
1. Department of Defense Schools 
The majority of entry and intermediate level schools 
throughout DoD cover C2 as part of a larger course 
identified in a number of ways including C3, C4I, C4I2, and 
so on.  Most entry-level and intermediate programs devote 
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only a few hours to the basics before moving into more 
technical material, which is focused on training.  The top-
level schools (for O-5s and O-6s) that focus on command and 
control exclusively as part of their curriculum do so in 
seminar format relying on the writings of Snyder, Van 
Creveld, Clausewitz, and the like.  Although these works 
were helpful, they did not provide a comprehensive list as 
many of the areas covered were beyond the scope of an 
introductory course.  A query of course outlines and 
academic summary sheets was most helpful in identifying 
resource material from which to build an outline.  Concepts 
covered in the command and control modules and the top-
level seminars provided boundaries to work within.  
 
2. Doctrinal Publications, C2 Oriented Books and 
Articles 
A readings-based approach to studying an area of 
interest is not a new idea.  Selecting a “best of” reading 
list is by nature a subjective undertaking.  Selection of 
books and articles was done so based on the following 
criteria: 
• Does the source explain one or more key command 
and control concepts? 
• Are the explanations geared toward the average 
military reader? 
• Is the source available to the larger military 
community? 
Material meeting the above criteria, and DoD doctrinal 
publications, were used to identify potential topics 
relevant to the study of command and control.  The focus 
was further defined after conducting interviews. 
  5
 
3.  Interviews with Senior Leaders, Professors, and 
    Students 
Discussion with active and retired flag officers was 
invaluable in helping identify the critical elements of 
command and control.  Their focus tended to be on the “art” 
of the process.  Recognizing strengths and weaknesses of 
the people under their charge and the importance of 
experience were the central themes of their message.  They 
also articulated a guarded concern regarding micro-
management that they perceived could occur as a result of 
an increased reliance on technology. 
Professors in the C3 and Special Operations academic 
groups not only provided guidance on class structure and 
the mechanics of course design, they also provided keen 
insight to the challenges faced by today’s decision makers 
and the role of the organization in building an effective 
command and control process.  They also assisted in case 
study selection to be used as a mechanism to augment 
classroom instruction with real-world challenges. 
Interviews were conducted with students to obtain an 
appreciation of what they felt were the relevant issues 
with regards to command and control.  Students interviewed 
were mid-grade officer (O-3 and O-4s) coming from all 
branches of the service and included those who had 
previously taken a course related to this area and those 
who had not.  Experience and command opportunities varied 
immensely, but none had worked extensively at the 
operational level.  The majority of those interviewed 
approached the topic from a systems standpoint and wanted a 
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better appreciation for the process and challenges we face 
in the future as we move towards a more networked 
organization.   
Based on these inputs, a recommended thesis outline 
was sent to, and approved by, the C3 academic group, which 
served as the framework for this research and course 
material development.  
 
E.  THESIS ORGANIZATION 
 Chapters II through VII address the fundamental topics 
identified with command and control.  Each chapter  
describes the salient points based on the reference 
material intermixed with personal interpretation based on 
experience and training.  Although the material is intended 
to be comprehensive in nature, my understanding of the 
material and opinions offered are in large part due to my 
specific branch of service and experiences.  Going to the 
source and pursuing the readings in their totality will 
certainly provide clarification if needed and other 
perspectives.  In addition to the bibliography, appendix 
(1) contains the most relevant references used in this 
study. They are intended for class reading assignments.  
Copyright authorization for their use is included.  
Appendix (2) contains the in-class presentation material, 
in the form of power-point slides.  These are intended to 
serve as a trigger mechanism for discussions on the 
concepts found in the readings.    
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Chapter II explores C2 terms and definitions as 
outlined in service and joint doctrine.  Some clarity is 
injected by identifying the relationship between command, 
command and control, and the systems involved.  The C2 
process emerges as the focal point of discussion, and the 
role of the components involved are addressed.     
 Chapter III examines the activities within the C2 
domain through the use of conceptual models. It examines 
characteristics and dynamics of the process and focuses on 
the importance of balance between information gathering and 
decision-making.  The operating environment is addressed, 
and an exploration of the evolution of C2 provides valuable 
insight into how technology has influenced the process.   
 Chapter IV describes organizational theories and how 
they are related to effectiveness.  Hierarchical and 
network properties are discussed and their utilization in 
the military bureaucracy is diagnosed.  Formulation of C2 
organizations, that allows us to realize the visions 
articulated in doctrine such as Joint Vision (JV) 2020, and 
the challenges associated with them, are discussed.   
Chapter V concentrates on decision making from a 
commander’s perspective.  Analytical and intuitive 
processes each have applicability, depending on the 
situation at hand.  The dynamics between organizational, 
informational, and operational decisions must be understood 
to ensure effectiveness as commanders strive to do the 
right thing faster and more accurately than the enemy.   
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Chapter VI focuses on the components of effective 
command and control.  Regardless of the system being used, 
it is the people in the process that are the key to 
success, and the commander is the heart of the system.  The 
role the commander takes, his relationship with staff and 
subordinates, and the flexibility he allows his subordinate 
commanders largely determines the effectiveness of their 
command and control system. 
Chapter VII is dedicated to the challenges associated 
with command and control.  The validity of information is a 
concern as commanders search for the right information to 
make the right decisions.  Sole reliance on technology to 
obtain, process, and deliver information leaves us 
vulnerable if the technology fails or becomes compromised.  
The most reliable and redundant systems provide little 
value if a significant investment is not made in people, 
training, and interoperability.  A top-down approach with 
regards to systems development is discussed, noting that it 
will be required if we are to meet emerging requirements 
with limited resources.   Competing for those limited 
resources by evaluating C2 systems as a force multiplier is 
difficult to accomplish.  Determining what data to analyze 
and how to collect it will often determine how well C2 
systems compete against weapon systems.  Both quantitative 
and qualitative analysis techniques to accomplish this are 
discussed.   
A summary of the information discussed throughout the 
thesis and some recommendations are offered in Chapter 
VIII.  It is important to understand the challenges of 
command control, both the ones we face today an the 
emerging ones of the future, before we can begin to offer 
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II. COMMAND AND CONTROL PRINCIPLES 
A.  TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 The term “command and control”, or some derivation 
thereof, has become a common part of today’s military 
vocabulary.  Most in our profession recognize the term, 
which unfortunately, is the limit of our shared 
understanding.  The breadth of C2 allows the term to mean 
whatever the user whishes it to mean.  Some may focus on 
the technology while others tend to concentrate on the 
human aspect of the topic.  Contributing to the problem is 
the proliferation of confusing terms, used interchangeably, 
relating to this area.  “Command,” “command and control,” 
“command, control, and communications,” and their seemingly 
never-ending extrapolations only add to the confusion.   
 The confusion does not obscure the basic nature of 
command and control, and any meaningful study of the topic 
requires common terms of reference.  These common terms of 
reference will provide the framework for shared concepts, 
based on a set of logical and coherent definitions, for the 
various aspects of command and control. (Thrasher, p. 4)  
Joint and service doctrine are the source documents upon 
which the foundational “framing” of the topic will be 
built, and an obvious place to start is with the Department 
of Defense (DoD) definition for command and control found 
in Joint Publication 1-02: 
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The exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned 
forces in the accomplishment of the mission.  
Command and control functions are performed 
through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
communications, facilities, and procedures which 
are employed by a commander in planning, 
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces 
and operations in the accomplishment of the 
mission. (JP 1-02, p.80) 
Service definitions use this as a guideline, with 
minor modifications to address unique mission or 
capabilities.  The Army defines C2 as: 
The exercise of authority and direction by a 
properly designated commander over assigned and 
attached forces in the accomplishment of the 
mission. (FM 6-0 Draft, p.1-1) 
The Navy definition is:  
Command and control enables the naval commander 
to understand the situation in his battlespace, 
select a course of action, issue intent and 
orders, monitor the execution of operations, and 
evaluate the results.  It is the primary tool he 
uses to cope with the disorder and uncertainty of 
warfare. (NDP 6, p.6) 
The Air Force expands upon the definition by 
describing it as: 
C2 includes both the process by which the 
commander decides what action is to be taken and 
the system which monitors the implementation of 
the system.  Specifically, C2 includes the 
battlespace management process of planning, 
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces 
and operations. C2 involves the integration of the 
systems of procedures, organizational structures, 
personnel, equipment, facilities, information, 
and communications designed to enable a commander 
to exercise command and control across the range 
of military operations. (AFDD1, p.160) 
Finally, the Marine Corps describes command and 
control as: 
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The means by which a commander recognizes what 
needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate 
actions are taken. (MCDP 6, p.37) 
 Buried within these definitions are the components of 
command and control.  Prominent figures in the study of C2 
such as Snyder, Coakley, and Van Creveld, and select 
military doctrine, help in defining the key components of 
the command and control process.  In order to understand 
the process it is necessary to understand the entities 
inherent to the process and their relationships.  The first 
critical component is about a commander exercising 
authority, or what is commonly called the command function.  
Control activities, occurring throughout and in conjunction 
with the command function comprise the C2 process.  The C2 
systems consist of the equipment, facilities and procedures 
that facilitate the function and process of command and 
control. 
  
1. The Command Function 
Central to understanding of C2 is the idea of “command”  
as a military function that has to be exercised more or 
less continuously. (Van Creveld, p.8)  Command is the 
authority vested in individuals in order to clearly 
delineate responsibility and foster unity of effort through 
the direction, coordination, and supervision of military 
forces.  Ultimately, it is the commander who is responsible 
for what has to be done and ensuring that decisions made 
are properly executed. (Snyder, p.44)  Considered mostly an 
art form, command improves with experience, training and 
self-development, but can only be exercised by the 
commander.  The art of command lies in the exercise of 
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authority to fulfill responsibilities through decision- 
making and leadership.  A commander is not identified as 
successful due to specific techniques or procedures he 
employs, but rather by his ability to accomplish the 
mission in the most efficient manner possible.  Regardless 
of the doctrine cited or expert quoted, command is the 
fundamental warfighting function that all other aspects of 
C2 must support. 
 
2. Control Activities 
Control activities would not exist without command,  
yet they serve the commander, allowing him to regulate 
forces and operating systems.  Activities include 
collecting, processing, displaying, storing, and 
disseminating information for use by the staff during 
planning, preparing for, executing, and assessing 
operations.  Communication conveys the information from one 
person or place to another and is multi-directional in 
nature providing for a feedback mechanism to the command 
function.  Relationships and procedures established 
throughout the organization enable control activities. (FM 
6-0 p. 1-2)  From this, it is clear that control involves 
the whole organization, especially those who are part of 
the C2 system and increases in complexity with each higher 
echelon of command.  People other than the commander can 
perform control activities, and in fact, this is one of the 
primary duties of the staff, but the commander must 
actively participate in either exercising or supervising 
control for it to be effective.   
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 Control is mostly science, but some art.  Objective 
data, analytic processes, and scientific methods and 
theories used in planning, preparing for, and executing 
operations address the scientific nature of control.  
Understanding and incorporating the notion that control 
activities will influence information obtained on friendly 
and enemy forces that will be used by the commander in 
performing the command function addresses the inherent art 
of effective control.          
  
3. The C2  Process  
The procedures employed by a commander in executing 
the C2 function (command) are called the C2 process.  The DoD 
definitions describe the process in which the command 
function and control activities are interwoven.  The C2 
process includes specific approaches a commander uses to 
learn, decide, organize, communicate and monitor.  These 
specifics can be as varied as the commanders influencing 
them, and therefore are not consistent between echelons of 
command, but all involve people, information, and 
structure.  A platoon commander will employ a different 
process than a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander.  These 
variances are a function of technology, location, 
organization, responsibility, and any number of variables 
that a commander may face in the chaotic nature of warfare.   
 Every military member, be it the most junior recruit 
going through entry level training, or the most senior 
officer at the pinnacle of his career, has experienced and 
been a part of a C2 process.  The most junior of our ranks 
probably have not thought about their duties and how they 
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fit into the larger picture in these terms, but the process 
directs them in their actions and they in turn contribute 
to its effectiveness.  The mechanisms used to identify what 
needs to be done and seeing to it that appropriate actions 
are taken to accomplish the tasks for the platoon commander 
certainly differ than those of the JTF commander conducting 
an amphibious exercise, but each is involved in a process 
unique to their level of command.   
 
4. Command and Control Systems 
C2 systems consist of applications, information 
management, and physical things that make up the 
information exchange and decision support subsytems used to 
facilitate the command and control process.  Snyder points 
out that while there is a unique C2 process for each 
commander, systems normally support the processes of 
several commanders.  Decision-makers usually stand apart 
from the systems that support them but are a part of the 
system supporting superior commanders. (Snyder pp. 10-13)  
While conducting the research for this thesis it was 
interesting to note that most training and education 
conducted regarding C2 focus on the tangible tools most 
commonly associated with systems.  Computers, switches, 
terminals, and protocols are most often discussed because 
they are more quantifiable and fit nicely into the 
“science” of command and control as opposed to the less 
tangible “art” of the process.  Truly integrating the 
systems into the process is a significant challenge that 
infiltrates functional areas, acquisition processes, 
organizational structures and the mind-set of all involved. 
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Figure 1.   C2 Component Interaction 
 
The terms used, based upon the agreed DoD definitions, 
provide a foundation for further discussion.  Figure 1 
depicts the interaction of the C2 components used for 
further exploration of the subject.  The command function 
is implemented via a C2 process and supported by various C2 
systems.  Command is the primary function, but is 
insufficient without control in today’s system intensive 
and technically oriented military.  An effective process 
involves all parts working in all directions.  The more 
seamless the integration between entities, the more 
effective the process becomes.  The goal is a mutually 
supporting system of give and take in which complimentary 
commanding and controlling forces interact to ensure that 
the organization as a whole can adapt continuously to 
changing requirements. (MCDP 6, p.40)  The components of 
the process have to work in a synchronized fashion, but it 
is the process that is critical in determining 
effectiveness.  
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C. COMPONENTS OF THE C2  PROCESS 
Decision making, at all levels, is the heart of the C2 
process.  It is the people that drive the process and make 
the decisions in an effort to accomplish the mission.  
Figure 2 shows the components of the process and their 
interactions in support of the decisions. 
  People are the focal point of the process as they 
gather information, communicate, cooperate, and make 
decisions.  The rest of the process exists only to serve 










Figure 2.   C2 Process Components 
 
Information is described in any number of ways but is 
defined as representations of reality, which is used to 
inform in the above process.  This can be done using words, 
letters, numbers, images and symbols to represent things, 
events, ideas and values.  Some replace “information” with 
“technology” in describing the process, depicting 
information, as a subset of that component.  Technology can 
facilitate information gathering and dissemination, but it 
is not required to obtain information.  Certainly 
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technology has an important role as it allows for the flow 
of information in all directions.  Its level of importance 
is dependent on which echelon of command one is operating 
at. 
Structure aids the people who create, disseminate, and 
use information.  It includes organizations, procedures, 
equipment, facilities, training, education and doctrine.  
Although these things are designed to assist people in the 
process, poor design and a lack of understanding, training, 
and education, can cause the opposite affect.  The same 
holds true for a dysfunctional organization as the 
decisions made regarding organizations affect all other 
types a commander will face. 
One can conclude that the process is only as strong as 
it’s weakest component.  People who do not understand the 
information requirements or how to disseminate critical 
data, hinder effectiveness.  Representations of outdated or 
improper information can also have devastating affects.  
Creating a process where people know what they need to know 
and understand the structure in such a way as to optimize 
information flow is the challenge that each of us face in 
every C2 process of which we are a part.  It is a dynamic 
system that requires attention and care, but one that 
offers significant dividends when we are more effective at 
it than our adversaries. 
The components of the C2 process require constant 
interaction and are not isolated from external factors 
impacting overall effectiveness.  Figure 3 is used to 
represent how the components of the process fit within the 














Figure 3.   Overall C2 View 
 
The environment in which the process is functioning 
and the technology being used to support information 
gathering and dissemination both create challenges which 
the process has to adapt to and overcome.  These issues are 
discussed in further detail in subsequent chapters.   
 
 
D. DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT 
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 A formal analysis of the doctrine development process 
is not required for insight into the topic of command and 
control.  The inclusion of this section stems from 
exploring current DoD publications and the writings of the 
recognized authorities on C2.  Military theorists such as 
Van Creveld, Sun Tzu, and a handful of others influence all 
current publications on the topic as evidenced by their 
bibliographies.  It is not hard to deduce which publication 
were signed first as all that follow cite those that came 
before.  This begs the question, “Who actually develops C2 
doctrine and are they equipped with the tools to accurately 
capture it’s importance?” 
 Action officers, contractors, and fleet input all 
contribute, but the experts among them may be few in 
number.  The changing face of warfare and the immersion of 
technology in every facet of our operations demands that 
the institution invest in education on the C2 process to 
meet future challenges head-on.    
 
E. SUMMARY 
 The command function is implemented via C2 processes  
which are supported by various C2 systems.  The process is 
influenced by the technology used, and the environment in 
which it is operating.  This conceptual model of the 
process is the common denominator that can be extracted 
from the doctrine, C2 authorities, and various publications 
cited, and the heart of command and control.  Command and 
control is a process describing what a leader or commander 
does transposed by several categories of tangible 
resources.  The goal of command and control is not limited 
to a single objective but centers on decision making in 
order to accomplish the mission while reducing uncertainty 
in a timely manner. (Coakley, pp. 24-27)  People are the 
key to the C2 process and are supported by information and 
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III. C2 PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Having taken a look at the doctrinal definitions and 
identified the functions associated with command and 
control, focus now shifts to the process and its 
components.  Exploring the activities of the process is  
necessary to fully comprehend what occurs within the C2 
domain.  To accomplish this, two representative models will 
be used as a mechanism to better understand the process and 
the interactions occurring between components.  These 
models represent what takes place during the C2 process, 
which is cyclic in nature and occurs almost continuously.  
We are often asked to think “out of the box” as we 
contemplate the future of warfare.  Understanding what’s in 
the box prior to embarking upon such an ambitious task will 
help to minimize turbulence during the journey.  Reflection 
on warfare over the ages and how it has evolved provides 
insight into some of the challenges we face in the future.      
 
B. BOYD’S OODA LOOP 
Arguably, the most recognized model for exploring the 
C2 process within the military is the one developed by 
Colonel John Boyd, USAF (ret) based on his experiences as a 
Korean War fighter pilot.  A decision-maker must “observe” 
what is happening, “orient” what he sees with what he 
already knows and what he wants, “decide” what must be done 
and then “act” to implement his decision.  Once action has 
been taken, the loop begins again.  Boyd’s OODA cycle is 
part of the tactical decision loop.  The idea is that the 
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commander who can complete the loop faster in battle has 
the clear advantage.  By operating faster than the 
opposition, a commander can react more rapidly to changing 
events and control them.  By progressively complicating the 
opponent’s decision cycle, one can eventually collapse the 
adversary’s C2 system and defeat him.  Boyd describes it  as 
a continuous “organic” process, as much of the loop takes 
place within the brain of the commander or decision maker.  
(Boyd, p. 26)  Figure 3 shows the Boyd model. 
 
Figure 4.   BOYD OODA LOOP (from Boyd, p. 26) 
 
Commander’s at all levels each have their own 
particular OODA loop, all operating simultaneously, but not 
in a synchronized manner or at the same rate.  Each loop is 
constrained by the speed of loops below it and in turn 
constrains the speed of the loops above.  Boyd’s model can 
be applied to the ground commander as well as to the 
fighter pilot engaged in air-to-air combat, but it may not 
be applicable in all organizations and situations.   
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1. Dissecting Boyd 
To better understand the model, consider the actions 
taking place as really two separate cycles operating at the 
same time.  The first is the information-gathering cycle, 
consisting of the observe and orient steps, and addresses 
the commander’s need to find out  “What is actually 
happening?”   This is accomplished primarily through 
interactions with the operating environment which consists 
of everything outside the process.  The second process, 
consisting of the decide and act steps, is the decision-
making cycle, which focuses on the commander’s need to 
decide “What can or should be done about it?” (Roman,p.8)   
A commander who has a very effective information-
gathering cycle, but who defers a decision, refuses to make 
a decision, or makes the wrong decision creates an 
imbalance in the process.  While the ability to observe and 
orient is high, this cycle is turning faster than his 
ability to decide and act on the information obtained.  
Even though his uncertainty is low his actions are 
counterproductive to his subordinates because his command 
decisions and abilities to direct appropriate actions are 
flawed. 
Now consider the commander with a poor information 
gathering cycle, offset by an ability to decide and act 
correctly at the right time with limited information.  
Inadequate information gathering that is overcome by 
experience, training, and procedures again creates an 
imbalance in the system.  No matter how qualified and 
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capable a commander, he will eventually make a poor 
decision given untimely or inadequate information. 
It is critical for a decision-maker to operate faster 
than or within an adversary’s OODA loop.  It is equally 
important that a balance exist between the information 
gathering cycle and decision-making cycle as the two define 
the operating tempo and determine the amount of uncertainty 
in the system.  Our ability to out-think our opponents 
hinges on the balance we create between these cycles within 
the C2 processes.  As we strive for faster decisions through 
the use of faster technology we must guard against 
sacrificing balance.  Decision-making, and the challenges 
associated with it, is  discussed in detail in chapter V. 
 
2. Impact of Technology 
The ability to observe, orient, decide, and act faster 
than one’s opponent will continue to be a necessity in 
future warfare.  History has shown that the tempo of 
operations caused by the impact of technology in warfare 
has accelerated.  One such example is the number of radio 
sets to soldier ratio.  In World War II there was one radio 
for every 38.6 soldiers.  This number rose to one radio for 
every 4.5 soldiers in Vietnam, an 857 percent increase. 
(Van Creveld, p.238)  As technology has improved and our 
reliance on it increased, the time for commanders to gather 
information and make decisions has decreased.  The time 
differential between information gathering and decision 
making has compressed to a point where they can no longer 
be sequential actions, much like the command style used by 
Alexander the Great, but must be simultaneous and 
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continuous.  This increases the likelihood of imbalance as 
the commander’s ability to orient himself and gain 
situational awareness diminishes in an effort to keep 
decision making up to speed with information gathering. 
The technology also serves a mechanism to enhance 
interactions with the environment.  Boyd’s model does not 
set out to influence the environment, but to observe what 
is taking place in the battlespace.  Enemy actions, 
weather, and terrain may change the data we obtain from the 
environment, but the focus remains on outpacing the 
opposing commander in developing situational awareness, 
developing and selecting a course of action, and issuing 
orders. 
The commanders at the lowest levels, who are able to 
observe their units in action and gather there own 
information based on the environment, most likely employ a 
C2 process that closely resembles the one described by Boyd.  
Commanders removed from the fight with larger organizations 
will rely more heavily on technology to gather information.    
The relative simplicity of the OODA loop, although having 
great intuitive appeal, may not be adequate to explain all 
of the command and control activities occurring at all 
levels.  Because of this, other detailed models, like The 
Lawson example, were developed to offer greater clarity and 
precision. 
 
C. THE LAWSON MODEL 
  27
 The Lawson model, as shown in Figure 5, is based upon 
the concept that the purpose of command and control is to  












Figure 5.   Lawson Model (from Coakley, p.33) 
  
Lawson introduces several additional items to amplify 
this point.  First, the “observe” block from Boyd’s model 
has been expanded into “sense” and “process.”  This more 
discrete approach is useful when viewing the C2 process as 
one that is more distributed, incorporating multiple 
sensors that produce data.  
The “compare” step is similar to the “orient” step 
used by Boyd and examines the current state of the 
environment against the desired end state.  This requires 
the commander to intellectually interpret the information 
received and decide what is to be done to change the 
environment to his advantage. (Coakley, p.33)   
Once the decision is made, the “act” step occurs as 
subordinate units receive their orders and execute their 
tasks while monitored from higher headquarters.  As this 
occurs, some change is made to the environment and the 
cycle starts again.  This model can also be interpreted in 
the information gathering and decision-making cycles that 
we applied to Boyd’s model, but Lawson’s focus on the 
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environment is where the difference between the models is 
the greatest. 
 
1. Focus on the Environment 
Lawson’s model is slightly more complex but provides a 
more precise sense of how the environment affects various 
levels of the command and control process.  He also 
acknowledges the fact that our actions must be conducted 
realizing that the enemy is also acting to change the 
environment.  
Lawson adds ones own forces to the environment where 
they are capable of influencing that environment.  Their 
actions or reactions to enemy forces will change the 
information developed from the previous cycle in the 
upcoming “sense” module.  The environment also includes 
enemy and allied forces whose actions also change the 
environment.  Weather, terrain, geo-political concerns and 
other items are also included in the environment.   
Technological factors also play a role in the Lawson 
model.  Just as we employ technology to facilitate the 
decision-making process, the enemy is also sing technology 
in an effort to reduce their decision times.  Asymmetrical 
warfare requires us to consider the abilities of our 
adversaries to disrupt and deny our technology through 
information-based operations.  Their ability to manipulate 
the automated tools we use for data collection and 
information processing would negatively affect our 
operating environment and disrupt our ability to command 
and control. 
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Lawson asserts that “to talk about a completely 
integrated C3I system is ridiculous.  Its various parts must 
be pretty much self-contained and perform definable and 
separable functions so that we can change one module 
without affecting all others.” (Signal Magazine, 1979)  The 
requirement to change a module would be driven by the 
desire to change the environment or a change required to 
deal with the environment. 
 
2. Model Summary 
The effectiveness of these models depends on one’s 
frame of reference.  Both illuminate and obscure issues 
important in the study of the command and control.  Boyd 
provides a simpler model that tends to focus on the 
opposing commander.  This concept, although applicable for 
any facet of warfare, may be more conducive for the 
tactical operator focused on outsmarting the enemy.  
Lawson’s model is more complex and focuses on the 
relationship between the environment and the process and 
how a change to either affects the other.  It applies steps 
that favor technological approaches to information 
gathering and most likely resembles the process occurring 
in larger and more complex organizations.  Both are subject 
to process variances through the use of technology and 
uncertainty of the environment.  These can have both 
positive and negative affects on the C2 process and 
effectiveness in pursuit of mission accomplishment.  A look 
back at the evolution of warfare is useful in understanding 
these models and their applicability as technology develops 
and the uncertainty of the environment increases.    
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D. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Van Creveld recognizes that command and control is as 
old as warfare itself.  From ancient armies of the 
Israelites and Alexander the Great to today’s forces 
engaged in fighting terrorism, all have employed a command 
and control process.  The role of technology, 
organizational structures, and their societies shaped how 
they commanded and determined the type of processes they 
used.  The earliest combatants referred to the C2 process 
and functions as simply “command” functions.  For thousands 
of years command covered everything that is now associated 
with command and control.  It has not been until recently, 
about the time World War II ended, that the term command 
and control began to appear in our vocabulary.  Experts 
have various opinions on how command evolved into command 
and control, but most agree that the size of forces, 
operational characteristics, and functional complexity have 
been the primary factors for the migration.  (Allard, p. 
28) 
 
1. Size of the Force 
Warfare is basically mass organizations of armed men 
who do battle with other mass organizations of armed men in 
the pursuit of victory.  Although victory is not always a 
function of force superiority, there exists the common 
perspective that more is better.  Increasing the number of 
men increases the problems for command and control of them.  
The standard solution has been to create a hierarchical 
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organization with echelons of command and an associated 
rank structure.   
With the growth of the force came the need to provide 
overarching guidance and coordination for the functions 
needed to support the warfighter, hence the birth of the 
staff.  General J. D. Hittle, in his book The Military 
Staff: Its History and Development stated: 
When some unknown warrior chief asked for help or 
advice from one of his co-belligerents, military 
history saw the first functioning of the military 
staff. (Allard, p. 29) 
The need to extend the commander’s span of control to 
carry out the functions of command through the use of staff 
became a natural progression as the size of the forces 
commanded grew. 
 
2. Operational Characteristics 
As armies grew and capabilities developed, the idea of 
combining functions to project a more lethal force emerged.  
Although the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries 
elevated the principles of combined arms, ancient armies 
incorporated these ideas through the use coordinated use of 
infantry, archery, and cavalry.  These varied capabilities 
and difficulties in coordinating them, increased the need 
for the personal control by the commander.  This too, added 
to led to echelons of command and staffs to coordinate and 
control activities of forces across the battlespace. 
Improvement of weapons and system capabilities 
requiring special skills also added to the challenge of  
command and the ability to control those involved with the 
  32
business of warfare.  Shouted battlefield commands, the 
ability to observe the entire engagement and the 
opportunity for the commander to influence the fight 
diminished as operational characteristics became more 
complex.  One only has to consider the number of 
specialties in today’s military required to move, shoot, 
and communicate to understand the span of control issues a 
commander faces.   
 
3. Functional Complexity 
The operational characteristics of a growing force and 
the need to extend command authority often contribute to 
functional complexity.  The more functionally diversified a 
large force is, the more complex the tasks of logistical 
support and operational employment.  The need to achieve 
greater effectiveness through delegation and the desire to 
retain overall operational control causes a fundamental 
tension.  To keep from instituting division of authority 
through a division of labor, commanders have always kept 
the reins of control as close as the situation would allow. 
This desire for unity of command was facilitated 
through staff positions like the chief of staff, logistics 
officer, and communications officer and through subordinate 
unit commanders, as forces diversified and span of control 
capabilities of one person diminished.  These factors 
complicated the command process and contribute to the 
migration from the term “command” to “command and control.”  





It is the command and control domain that the models 
attempt to clarify.  Central to the domain and C2 is the 
process.    Decision-making is the product of the process 
that puts forces into motion.  People, information, and 
structure are the components of the process that are 
supported by systems to facilitate the command function.  
The more fully understood the domain, the easier it becomes 
to identify potential problems brought on by technology and 
changes to the operating environment.  One’s ability to 
study the process and identify strengths and weakness 
corresponds to how well the commander and the process deal 
with the uncertainty of warfare.  The skills of those 
involved and the use of technology to build better 
situational awareness help the commander deal with things 
we anticipate, but do not know about the situation.  It is 
stability and flexibility of the process that will be the 
driving factors in handling issues that one did not know 







Order or disorder depends on organization. (Sun 
Tzu, 1993) 
Organization(s) fall within our description of the C2 
process, as a subset of structure, but it is an extremely 
important element as decisions made regarding the 
organization affect all other decision a commander makes, 
as discussed in chapter V.  Organizing includes setting up 
the unit, determining who talks to who, where information 
must flow, who may make what kinds of decisions, and what 
reports are required.  Organization drives behavior of 
people who in turn drive the C2 process, and the orientation 
of an organization determines, or is a product of the 
degree of uncertainty, a commander is willing to tolerate.  
Today’s military organization must be adaptive to changes 
imposed by the environment as the face of warfare changes.   
Having stated why a discussion on organizations is so 
important, we begin exploration of the topic with some 
basic definitions.  
 
B. DEFINITIONS AND ELEMENTS 
Organizations are fundamentally social structures 
where an individual, in association with others, has the 
potential to reach certain levels of fulfillment that might 
otherwise be unattainable.  Organizations supply both a 
condition and a context for dealing with our various 
environments.  Organizations represent a culmination of 
social order that links the individual to a collective body 
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that in turn provides a service to the individual while it 
simultaneously serves the society.  Schools, police 
departments, and the military are examples of organizations 
whose character is to gather the interests, needs, and 
desires of people into an entity that represents what it is 
they want.  (Strategic Leadership and Decisionmaking, p. 3)  
Organization serves an important function of providing 
sources of group identity for members of the organization.  
An organization operates most effectively when its members 
think of themselves as belonging to one or more groups 
characterized by high levels of loyalty, cooperation, 
morale, and commitment to the group mission. (FM6-0, p.5-
22)  There is no universally agreed-upon framework for 
classifying successful organizations, but many experts on 
the topic agree that Mintzberg’s recent work comes closest 
to identifying commonalities.   
 
C. COMMON ELEMENTS 
Theories regarding the elements of an organization 
exist ad nauseam.  One such theorist, Henry Mintzberg, 
argues that there are five basic parts to any organization.  
Each part described has some application to the military 
organization but there are friction points as there are no 
hard and fast rules for how an institution chooses to 
organize.  Exploring the common elements described below 
provides insight into our organizations and potential 
changes we face as we contemplate our visions of the 
future.  Mintzberg's elements are shown in Figure 4 and are 




1. The Operating Core 
Defined as employees who perform the basic work, the 
operating core is related to the production of product and 
services.  In a military organization, the operating core 
can be thought of as the young soldiers, sailors, airmen 
and Marines who carry out the orders of superiors.  Our 
business requires a young work force, and our operating 
core comprises the bulk of our forces.  Clearly delineating 
what ranks fill the operating core is not an easy task as 
we require many of the operating core to perform other 
functions.  This is true for most of Mintzberg’s elements.   
When control lies with the operating core, decisions 
are decentralized.  When combined with standardization a 
professional bureaucracy occurs that is efficient, but 
requires a high level of specialized expertise in order to 
be effective.  Conflicts can develop between subunits, 
capable of performing specialized tasks, due to narrow 
objective pursuit.  This type of organization is best 
utilized when matched with a large size unit, operating in 
a complex and stable environment, utilizing a routine 
technology that is internalized through professionalism. 
(Robbins, p. 165) 
 
2. The Strategic Apex 
Flag officers, and the most senior civilian employees 
within DoD comprise the strategic apex of the military 
organization as they are charged with the overall 
responsibility for the organization.  One could argue that 
in smaller units such as battalions, squadrons, or 
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individual ships, that the apex does not require flag 
officers.  Those units, and the individuals in charge of 
them, do not operate in an independent nature, rather their 
actions are part of a larger comprehensive plan which 
directs their actions.  This is especially true in today’s 
joint environment. 
When the strategic apex is dominant, control is 
centralized and the organization is a simple structure.  
Typically, these organizations are low in complexity, have 
little formalization, and have authority centralized in a 
single person.  It resembles a flat organization with all 
functional areas reporting to one person where decision-
making resides.  It is a simple structure that is fast and 
flexible, and requires little to maintain.  Accountability 
is clear and there are few layers of bureaucracy.  It is 
limited in applicability as larger organizations do not fit 
well within this model.  There is also little 
counterbalance to the central decision maker and abuse of 









Figure 6.   Mintzberg Elements (from Robbins, p. 279) 
  38
 
3. The Middle Line 
The individuals who connect the operating core to the 
strategic apex are the middle line managers.  Within our 
organizations we have a number of echelons with commanders 
who constitute this group.  They are responsible for the 
their organization, which is a subset of the institution, 
and certainly contribute to the success of the institution, 
but they are not responsible for the entire institution.   
Determining where to draw the line with regards to who 
fits into this category and who does not is not terribly 
important for the military organization.  The squad leader 
may not have the same responsibilities as the division 
commander, but they each play an important role as part of 
this group.  What is important, is understanding how this 
group interacts with the others and the dangers that can 
occur when individuals in the middle line act 
independently. 
Theoretically, groups of autonomous units operate in a 
divisional structure, each typically a machine bureaucracy 
unto itself with highly routine operating tasks, 
coordinated by a central headquarters.  Middle managers in 
this scenario are afforded a great deal of control.  Goals 
of the functional unit tend to override those of the 
organization.  More accountability is present as more 
responsibility is placed in the hands of the divisional 





4. The Technostructure 
Determining who has the responsibility for effecting 
certain forms of standardization in the organization is not 
as clean a process for the military as it is for the 
business community.  To some extent, we are all responsible 
for adhering to standards but we are not all analysts as 
Mintzberg describes.  Certainly those individuals with 
technical skill sets fall into this category, but they also 
are a part of another group, be it operating core, middle 
line, or support staff.  The civilian component of our 
organization fits the description as well.  So once again, 
there is some problem with a direct translation to the 
military.    
Standardization is the key component of the machine 
bureaucracy, which is what occurs when the technostructure 
is dominant.  Highly routine operating tasks and formalized 
rules and procedures, grouped into departments coupled with 
centralized authority, decision making along a chain of 
command and an elaborate administrative structure are its 
characteristics.  Because of this, standardized activities 
are performed in a highly efficient manner but one runs a 
risk when confronting inflexibility as people may become 
obsessed with following the rules.  Because units can work 
autonomously, conflict can occur as unit goals can override 
the goals of the organization. 
 
5. The Support Staff 
People who fill staff positions, providing indirect 
support services for the organization comprise this group.  
We are no strangers to staff functions and responsibilities 
  40
and the definition provided fits our organization well.  In 
the military organization it is often the staff that writes 
and enforces operating procedures and standards much like 
the technostructure described above. 
An adhocracy arises when the support staff is the 
ruling body.  It is characterized by high horizontal 
differentiation, low vertical differentiation, low 
formalization, decentralization, great flexibility and 
responsiveness.  Decision-making in this type of structure 
is decentralized as it depends on decentralized teams of 
professionals working together to make decisions.  An 
adhocracy is useful when adaptivity and creativity are 
required that rely on the input of diverse disciplines in a 
collaborate manner to achieve common goals.  Complex 
problems are also handled well by this type of 
organization.  Adhocracy lacks the advantages of 
standardized work and can cause conflict as a result as 
there tend to be no clear boss-subordinate relationships.  
It is best utilized when the operating environment is 
dynamic or complex.  Our battle staff configurations tend 
to fit within this description. 
From this brief discussion, it easy to see that our 
organization often requires individuals to be members of 
two or more groups as described by Mintzberg.  Attempts at 
categorization would have to consider such things as rank, 
billet assignment, training, and experience.  It could also 
be applied for each echelon of command.  The very fact that 
we require people to simultaneously be members of two or 
more groups is a strength of the organization that helps 
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give us flexibility and allows us to adapt to changes from 
the environment. 
 
D. ORGANIZATIONAL PROPERTIES 
Having taken a look at possible types of organizations 
and the elements thereof, it is necessary to describe 
internal organizational properties prior to examining the 
military bureaucracy.  The first of these properties is 
complexity.  Organizations are complex because of the scope 
of work, variety of people and operating environments, the 
relationships with the environment, and the differences 
between the divisions within the organization.  The mix of 
task, people, communication, problem solving and decision-
making, and their permutations and combinations contribute 
to the complexity.   
Surprise is the second property of organizations.  
Predictions of the impact of plans considered in reaching a 
decision are not fully reliable.  Actions or decisions of a 
leader may be misinterpreted if not articulated properly 
leading to unanticipated actions by other members of the 
organization.  Poor policies, parochial views, and 
overstating the severity of problems can all contribute to 
procedural flaws that can have a negative affect on the 
populous and spawn unanticipated reactions. 
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Organizations are deceptive, in that structure, 
culture and practice frequently mask things that may really 
be occurring.  Hidden information and massaging of 
analytical evaluation mechanisms in order to improve 
organizational perception are just two examples of the 
deception that may take place.  This behavior is 
particularly dangerous if recognized in the actions of the 
leaders by subordinates who may, adopt these practices in 
turn.  Understanding what takes place in the trenches of 
the organization or what we in the military term leadership 
by walking around, may be the best mechanism to get the 
pulse of the organization and unmask the deceptions. 
Organizations tend to be ambiguous. Trying to find out 
what is really taking place is complicated by such things 
as quality and reliability of information.  Complete 
honesty may not be the driving factor for those desiring 
recognition and promotion.  Interaction with the 
environment also adds to the ambiguity, but it is an 
interaction that is necessary for survivability and 
viability.  (NDU, Organizational Processes and Leadership 
Requirements, p. 3)    
 
E. OPEN SYSTEM ORGANIZATIONS 
Today’s military organizations exist in global 
environments that can be categorized as multifaceted, 
unpredictable, and complex.  Since the organizations are so 
highly engaged with their environments, they are considered 
open systems.  Successful organizations develop 
characteristics and perform processes that allow them to 
adapt to constraints, threats, and opportunities.  They 
import capability from the environment and their actions 
affect the environments themselves.  The capability is 
achieved by obtaining information needed to transform 
requirements into desired outputs such as services or 
operational actions.  The transformation processes are 
cyclical in nature and somewhat predictable as observations 
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that drive the transformation are part of the C2 process as 
identified in the models discussed. (NDU,Systems Thinking 
and Learning Organizations, p. 3) 
An interdependency exists between the system and the 
environment.  Changes in the environment affect one or more 
properties of the system, and, conversely, changes in the 
system affect its environment.  There is a boundary between 
the system and the environment, which can be symbolic or 
physical, but ones does exist.  
Theoretically, negative entropy can exist in such a 
system. The system can repair itself, maintain its 
structure, and even mature as it has the ability to import 
more energy than it expends.  This input of energy tends to 
offset entropy and the system normally maintains some 
constancy in energy exchange.  Even with a constant flow of 
new inputs and outputs, the character of the system remains 
the same.  As an open system becomes more complex in an 
effort to fend off entropy, it tends to grow and expand.  
Prudent organizations operate within a margin of safety to 
ensure effectiveness.   
Maintenance activities for equipment and personnel 
play an important role in the system as they seek stability 
and preservation of the status quo.  Recognizing this, it 
is also important to recognize that adaptive activities are 
needed so that the system can adjust over time to 
variations in internal and external demands.  A balance of 
maintenance and adaptability is key to the survival of the 
system. 
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Finally, open systems can reach the same final end- 
state through differing initial conditions by a variety of 
paths.  Understanding the elements and properties of 
organizations and the characteristics of an open-system 
will help in understanding the military bureaucracy and 
determining if we are organized in such a way that our 
interactions with the environment allow us to be as 
effective as possible. 
 
F. THE MILITARY BUREAUCRACY 
Defense bureaucracies produce tremendous quantities of 
information about the external environments in which they 
operate.  Data gathered is transformed into information to 
support all levels of decision-making.  But a potential 
problem exists.  Government agencies, particularly the 
Department of Defense, use sets of standards to achieve 
stability and accomplish programmable outcomes.  The 
organizational standards we have been using for decades may 
not be best suited for the information and technology based 
warfare of the future and the need to respond to potential 
environmental challenges.  Change in the environment, 
rather than stability, is the norm.  These changes can have 
strategic implications beyond the realm of any single 
decision-maker and require us to analyze the organization’s 
ability to respond.  The two most common type of C2 
organizational structures are hierarchical and networked.   
 
1. The Hierarchical Organization 
Traditionally, the military has been hierarchically 
organized because it requires less communications and 
substantially simplifies the planning and control 
functions.  This approach attempts to turn the entire force 
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into an extension of the commander as subordinates respond 
in precise and standardized ways to his orders and provide 
him with the data necessary to control the entire force. 
(Roman, p.13)  It also identifies which commanders are 
empowered to make which decisions.  Connectivity is 
engrained in this hierarchy as information gathering and 
the passing of that information to higher levels, are 
procedures associated with centralized management of the 
battlespace.  It is rigid in the sense that decision- 
making is under the personal control of the commander and 
the power associated with each level of command is a 
function of how much, and the kind, of information 
controlled.  He determines what information to provide to 
subordinates.  In an effort to eliminate uncertainty, C2 is 
centralized, formal, and inflexible. 
The very nature of controlling information defeats the 
optimum use of the information.  At each echelon of 
command, information is gathered and decisions made before 
the information is forwarded up or down the chain of 
command.  Some form of filtering, adding, deleting, and 
modification is done at each level, which is time consuming 
and can often result in the critical information not 
reaching the right people, or getting there too late.  
Controlled information becomes slow information, a 
perceived problem of cited by tactical users of information 
generated by the intelligence community.  In attempting to 
get the right information to the right people on time, some 
degrees of freedom are required at all levels to better 
balance decision-making.  
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The technological advances we have enjoyed over the 
last couple of decades have driven higher levels of 
centralized control and subsequently decision-making.  This 
may not be true in all situations, but it appears that a 
trend has in fact developed.  This trend threatens 
ingenuity and initiative at the lowest level and requires 
trust in subordinates to overcome.  Commanders, who have 
the technical capacity to centrally manage the battle, have 
been most successful when they delegate tactical 
responsibility and avoid interference in the authority of 
subordinates. (Roman, p. 14)  The increased amounts of 
information require faster decisions to keep up with the 
increased tempo of warfare.  Perhaps our hierarchical 
organization and control of information hinders our ability 
to accomplish this. 
 
2. The Networked Organization 
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Organizations requiring faster decisions due to an 
ever-changing operational environment tend to take a 
decentralized approach.  The networked organization seeks 
to accommodate this by accepting a reduced degree of 
certainty at the top to facilitate decision-making at the 
bottom.  This is needed with this approach based on the 
desire to increase the amount of information available to 
everyone within the organization.  The greater the degree 
of control, the less number of alternatives available for 
problem resolution. (Crecine and Salomine, p.50)  The 
decentralized control fostered by the networked 
organization makes better use of technology according to 
several studies by the RAND Corporation and the USAF’s 
Scientific Advisory Board.  Theoretically, operations in 
this type of organization are autonomous at all levels with 
the commander controlling only in the sense of directing a 
cooperative problem-solving effort. 
A networked sharing of information is much different 
than that of the hierarchical control of information.  When 
all levels of command share the same information, 
uncertainty may increase, but faster decision-making is 
possible.  Troops engaged will have and generate more 
information than the headquarters.  Chaos in warfare arises 
from adding more energy or information to the system.  
Those engaged must be empowered to use the information they 
generate, and that from other sources, for their decision-
making in responding to local conditions.  This does not 
come without challenges, as the need to balance legitimate 
requests for information while allowing commanders the 
freedom of action is a difficult one. (Roman, p. 16)    
Modern technology makes the sharing of information at 
all levels possible.  Practicality is another issue.  If  
front-line forces need the technology, they will also need 
the support to make the technology work for them.  
Equipment strings, logistic support in the form of 
batteries, and technician support to install and maintain 
the technology we speak of, are issues to be wrestled with 
before this type of information sharing and networking is 
possible.  Will the technicians required to configure and 
troubleshoot equipment become a part of the initial waves 
ashore?  Does the bandwidth exist to support the 
requirements if we are to migrate to a networked 
organization?  There are numerous difficult issues, like 
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these, that need to be addressed, if a networked 
organization is to be adopted for use by the military. 
Information available to all in the networked 
organization raises issues of potential gaps and overlaps 
between units.  Care has to be taken to ensure actions are 
not duplicated or not taken at all based on assumptions.  A 
hasty response might be to apply some sort of filter, 
defeating the purpose of a networked organization.   
Tough decisions are required for those in the 
military, especially for those in combat.  Military 
commanders must make life and death decisions and put 
subordinates at risk on a routine basis.  In a 
collaborative, networked environment, who will make the 
hard decisions and take responsibility for the outcomes?  
War requires commanders first, not collaborators.  This 
does not preclude the commander from using collaboration 
and the associated tools, but the individual must 
eventually make the hard decisions.  The military exists to 
be effective in pursuit of missions assigned, so the 
organization we adopt must first be effective. 
 
3. The Effective Organization 
The military exists to be an effective force in 
accomplishment of assigned missions in protection of our 
vital interests.  Efficiency is desired as well, especially 
from the standpoint of the civilian oversight of DoD, who 
are trying to match requirements with available resources.  
But it is effectiveness that we must focus on as we 
evaluate our organizational structure and the future 
challenges we face.  Characteristics of an effective 
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organization are as broad ranging and diverse as the study 
of command and control.  Peters and Waterman’s book, In 
Search of Excellence, does a good job of identifying eight 
common characteristics of Fortune 500 companies.  They are: 
1.  They have a bias for action and getting things 
    done. 
2. They stayed close to their customers in order to 
fully understand their need. 
3. They allowed employees a high degree of autonomy 
and fostered the entrepreneurial spirit. 
4. They sought to increase productivity through 
employee participation. 
5. Their employees knew what the company stands for, 
and their managers were actively involved in 
problems at all levels. 
6. They stayed close to the business they knew and 
understood. 
7. They had organization structures that were 
elegantly simple, with a minimal number of people 
in staff support activities. 
8. They blended tight, centralized controls for 
protecting the company’s core values with loose 
controls in other areas to encourage risk-taking 
and innovation.  (Robbins, p. 52) 
 
This research has received its share of criticism but 
it is a good starting point in evaluating current 
organization and recommended changes for the future.  We 
are a force that relies on technology and this reliance 
will continue to grow as we prepare for engagements of the 
future.  It will be necessary to craft an organization that 
has the proven effectiveness of the hierarchical model 






G. THE FUTURE C2 ORGANIZATION 
 Considering our current organization, the need to 
share information at all levels, and the responsibility to 
remain an effective fighting force requires some changes to 
current configurations.  The goal is an organization that 
combines decentralized decision-making (flattened-
hierarchical), which is facilitated through shared 
information-gathering and dissemination (networked).  
Development of such an organization, and more importantly, 
the cultural change that would be required to make such a 
change successful, is easier said than done. 
 Some interesting dynamics occur when once considers 
how this is to be accomplished.  Eliminating layers of 
command between the commander and the operational forces 
may facilitate the execution of decisions by the commander, 
but it may not cause decisions to be made any faster.  
Multiple units reporting directly to an operational 
commander increase the information load on that commander.  
A vicious loop can develop where the commander becomes 
slave to the computer.  It is also unlikely that we will 
face an enemy technically superior to us.  Turning inside 
our decision loop faster than the enemy may not be our 
primary concern.  To only think about speed of the process 
may lead us to prompting and responding to our own inputs 
which will fracture situational awareness and increase 
uncertainty.  Maybe the focus should be on what to do once 
inside the enemy’s decision loop.  Increased time for 
analysis and appropriate response would be the prudent 
course, even though this will slow the decision and 
execution steps of the C2 process.  Our goal then, should be 
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not speed of the cycle, but having the ability to control 
the rate of loop as some situations will require faster 
decisions, and others, a more cautious and slower approach.  
Some would argue that when having superior technological 
advantages over our enemy we should improve our decision-
making loop by extending it, not shortening it.  To do 
otherwise would only cause us to make several poor 
decisions to his one. 
 Span of control issues emerge with the removal of 
intermediate echelons of command.  How much one person or 
one staff can actually control in this type of organization 
will depend a plethora of things associated with the 
actions occurring at that time.  An approach must be 
adopted that ensures voids are not created as span of 
control becomes more difficult.  Unity of command 
implemented via mission type orders is not a new concept, 
and will help address such issues, but will commanders and 
subordinates be disciplined enough to allow the degrees of 
freedom necessary with this approach?  Command by negation 
concepts, where subordinates only require direction and 
guidance when working outside the scope of the commander’s 
intent may be adopted, but danger lurks as personal 
interpretations enter the equation.    
 Eliminating layers of command will also require the 
technology to extend the information flow to the lowest 
operational units.  Equipping every person or fire-team 
with equipment needed to work in the information dominated 
environment increases technical and logistical support.  
Correctly implemented, a networked force would increase 
lethality and effectiveness.  Incorrectly implemented or 
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poorly supported, it could have unit commanders operating 
in the blind, which would hamstring commanders at all 
levels.  The reliance and dependency instilled in 
commanders on the technology to make decisions may diminish 
the flexibility, ingenuity, and initiative imperative to 
the decentralized decision-making we expect when 
commander’s intent has been clearly articulated through the 
hierarchical organization. 
 
1. Recommended Approach  
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 Perhaps in building the C2 organization of the future 
we should focus on synchronization as a goal.  The 
technology being used will require training for all those 
involved.  These individuals, regardless of rank or 
echelon, could also be considered part of the 
technostructure we described earlier.  Familiarity with the 
networked systems will take time for users, and those 
required to support.  Synchronization might take longer to 
develop in an interconnected and operationally dispersed 
organization.  It also requires increased organizational 
knowledge by those within the unit.  This leads to improved 
performance through self synchronization.  Increasing 
lengths of billet assignments may be a mechanism to 
overcome some of the obstacles mentioned here.  The idea 
stems from the consistently superior results reserve units 
obtain in yearly tank gunnery contests.  Almost without 
exception, the winning crews are from reserve units who 
have worked together on the same system for years.  
Adopting this approach may give us the best opportunity for 
success when organizing to leverage technology and 
decentralize decision-making.   
 This approach is not without challenges from 
operational and personnel tempos, but could be possible 
with the removal of intermediate echelons of commands.  The 
task-organized force of the future may be conducive to such 
an approach.    
  
H. SUMMARY 
 These are just a few, of the multitude of issues, 
facing our military as we articulate our future operational 
vision and is worthy of a thesis dedicate entirely to 
exploring possible options and recommendations.  Our 
military organizations naturally resist change and 
overcoming the social challenges may be our biggest 
obstacle as we attempt to organize in such a way that takes 
advantage of a networked organization while maintaining a 
hierarchical decision-making concept.     
The challenge for us is to build a force capable of 
operating effectively in the information-dominant world we 
live in now and will continue to pursue in the future.  
Understanding the theory of organizations along with our 
current structure will help us deal with the challenges 
that lie ahead.  In maximizing the advantages available 
through technology, any attempt to reorganize must be one 





V. DECISION THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The organizational framework, which can be thought of 
as the chain of command, will influence decisions made by 
the commander as the C2 process is executed.  Decision-
making is the heart of the process, and the effective 
command and control we speak of is only possible with 
timely decisions and actions.  Decision-making is a large 
measure of the art of command, as command responsibilities 
are fulfilled by decisions made and leadership.  In working 
through the decision-making process, the commander analyzes 
current state, the desired end-state, and the transitional 
state.  The desired end state must be clearly defined 
before putting decisions into action as a mechanism to 
track progress and control forces in pursuit of that state. 
 Decision-making is still very much a human endeavor.  
Advances in technology to assist the commander such as 
computer-assisted logic tools and artificial intelligence 
have not progressed as rapidly as information gathering 
technology.  As more and more information is made 
available, the decision maker’s ability to process and act 
on that information depends on many factors including 
experience, stress level, and his intellectual process.  As 
Van Creveld states: 
The paradox is that, though nothing is more 
important in war than unity of command, it is 
impossible for one man to know everything.  The 
larger and more complex the forces that he 
commands, the more true this becomes.  (Van 
Creveld, p.109)  
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 This statement and its validity have implications on 
decision-making and the techniques used by the commander in 
arriving at them.  
The commander, when making decisions that can be 
categorized as organizational, informational, or 
operational, uses intuitive and analytical approaches.  
Exploration of these approaches and the types of decisions 
a commander is faced with will reveal that in practice, a 
commander will use a variety of techniques in making 
decisions.  The true evaluation of the commander is not the 
techniques he uses, but whether his procedures were 
appropriate for the situation.  It is the artful 
combination of intuitive and analytical decision-making 
that largely determines appropriateness of decisions and 
ultimately effectiveness.  
 
B. ANALYTICAL DECISION-MAKING 
 The traditional approach to decision-making is one 
that generates several alternative solutions, compares 
those alternatives to some set of criteria in determining 
value of the outcome, and selects the best approach.  
Course of action development, analysis, and selection is an 
example of the analytical approach.  The goal is to produce 
the optimal solution to the problem from those feasible 
solutions identified.  Analytical reasoning applied in a 
methodical fashion is the approach taken when tackling 
problems that require analysis and are not time critical.  
It is an approach best guided by an experienced commander 
or staff who can break tasks down into recognizable 
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elements.  For the less experienced it provides a 
methodology to work within.    
This approach works well for the commander working in 
a complex or unfamiliar environment as it ensures they 
consider, analyze, and evaluate all relevant factors.  
Those decisions requiring significant computational effort 
are also best served through this approach.  It also serves 
as a mechanism for resolving conflict between available 
recommendations.  This approach is a time-consuming 
evolution as it often requires participation from staff and 
subordinates.  Each service has its own particular planning 
process that grows in scope and size with each echelon of 
command.  Decision-making during execution is not well 
served by this approach, as time becomes a constraint when 
we attempt to execute our C2 processes faster than our 
opponents. (FM 6-0, p. 2-12) 
Heavy reliance on staff and subordinate commanders to 
develop courses of action is common-place amongst the 
services. It is not unusual for a commander to be briefed 
on the recommended courses of action without participating 
in the planning process.  More than once a course of action 
selection brief has turned into a commander’s intent brief 
because the commander was busy controlling the execution of 
ongoing operations and was not intimately involved with the 
details of the upcoming operation.  This can increase the 
time required for decisions to be made and negatively 
impacts effectiveness.  There is an appropriate time for 
this type of approach to decision-making regardless of the 
impact of technology or our future organizational 
structure.  As we work to increase information flow, remove 
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levels of hierarchy, and decrease decision-making time in 
future engagements, finding the resources to accomplish 
this, and the commander who is able to extract himself from 
current operations, may hinder its utility. 
 
C.  INTUITIVE DECISION-MAKING 
 Intuitive decision-making focuses on assessing the 
current situation rather than analyzing courses of action 
when time does not allow for an analytical approach.  It is 
an act of decision-making that emphasizes recognition based 
on judgment, knowledge, experience, education, intellect, 
boldness, perception, and character.  Intuitive decision-
making is emphasized in a chaotic environment because 
uncertainty and time drive most decisions.  It relies on an 
experienced commander’s and to some extent, staff’s 
intuitive ability to: 
• Recognize the key elements and implications of a 
particular problem or situation 
• Reject the impractical 
• Select an adequate course to address the problem 
(FM 6-0, p.2-13) 
It is a “gut” feeling approach that can serve as a 
substitute for missing information, provide some assistance 
when acting in uncertainty, and significantly speed up the 
decision-making process.  It strives to find the first 
solution to solve the problem, rather than waiting for the 
optimal solution and is considered an art when done 
correctly.  It recognizes that there is no absolute “right” 
answer as the commander is unlikely to have complete and 
perfect knowledge of the situation in a time-sensitive 
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atmosphere.  General Patton addressed battlefield problems 
in this way:  
A good plan violently executed now is better than 
a perfect plan next week.  (George S. Patton Jr, 
as quoted in NDP 6-0, p. 24) 
In replacing analysis with experience and judgment, 
and monitoring only a few variables, faster decisions are 
made.  This faster approach based on only a few variables  
supports the theory that war is ultimately an art rather 
than a science. In reality, commanders incorporate 
analytical methods when time permits rather than intuitive 
decisions as, no matter how good a commander is, he will 
eventually make a bad decision with inaccurate or 
incomplete information. 
Commanders do in fact use a combination of approaches 
in reaching decisions.  Determining which approach is 
appropriate is largely a function of time available, 
situational awareness, and level of uncertainty that is 
acceptable.   
 
D. DECISION-MAKING IN PRACTICE 
 Many theorist believe that military decision-making is 
a two stage activity in which the first stage is 
recognizing the class of the problem, followed by applying 
specific problem solving techniques indicated by the 
problem structure.  They believe problem solvers learn a 
number of problem-solving templates, which contain 
procedural information including indicators as to which 
template is the appropriate one to apply, types of 
information needed for generating alternate solutions, and 
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procedures for implementing solutions. (Orr, p.55 citing 
Dennis K. Leedom)  Recognition of the class of problem can 
lead to either an analytical or intuitive approach, but 
more often than not the two approaches are not mutually 
exclusive.  Intuitive decisions in the form of best guesses 
and estimates are often made in conjunction with a larger 
analytical process as we attack large, complex problems by 
breaking them down into smaller components.  The reciprocal 
of this is also true.  In dealing with the organizational, 
information, and operational decisions that commanders are 
faced with, most incorporate a number of templates and use 
both the approaches discussed.   
  
E.  TYPES OF DECISIONS 
 In discussing the types of decisions that commanders 
face it is necessary to understand the relationship between 
the three mentioned previously.  Although it is the 
operational decision and the employment of forces that is 
normally associated with commanders, this type of decision 
cannot be made before organizational and informational 
decisions.  Organizational decisions impact the other two 
types by establishment of information flow and a chain of 
command in which to carry out the actions in pursuit of the 
desired end-state.  Informational decisions precede 
operational decisions and address the current state, 
incorporating information from the environment in which 
forces are operating.  Figure 7 graphically depicts the 








   
Figure 7.   Decision Type Interaction 
 
1. Organizational Decisions 
Beyond establishing a chain of command and a chain of 
responsibility for success or failure, organizational 
decisions establish “who decides what” through the 
establishment of a C2 structure and specifying what role 
each commander is to play in the process.  Finally, 
organizational decisions establish the function that 
systems are expected to support. (Snyder, p. 42) 
Few commanders have the luxury of making the 
organizational decisions that effect informational and 
operational decisions.  As a result, the flow of 
information and the chain of command are fixed entities 
that they have to work within.  So even though each 
commander employs a unique C2 process, it is influenced by 
the structure that is in place as a result of others’ 
decisions.  Some implications that can arise from this are 
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limited resources from which information can be obtained 
and the inability to maintain unity of effort when forces 
required are not at a commander’s disposal. 
This brings us back to the discussion of 
organizational changes to take advantage of technology, 
improve information flow, and remove intermediate levels of 
command in pursuit of network-centric operations.  Instead 
of technology fitting within the organization, we are 
actually talking about technology decisions driving 
organizational decisions, which will impact the 
informational and operational decisions.  Caution is called 
for as we move in this direction.  The technological 
solution designed to work within existing organizations is 
much easier than changing the organizations to take 
advantage of emerging technology, but can we afford to 
continue to do business in this fashion?       
 
2. Informational Decisions 
The organization will define how we obtain information 
and how the flow of information will occur.  The 
information gathering steps of the C2 process are largely 
about gaining situational awareness or understanding the 
current state in which operations are occurring.  As Snyder 
points out, ‘Commanders make decisions on the basis of what 
they believe is happening.’ (Snyder, p.28)  What they think 
they know is directly tied to previous experience, 
training, and cognitive skills, which help shape the 
decision-making templates.  Decisions made on how a 
commander sees the current situation will always be biased 
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to some extent and may not accurately reflect what is 
actually happening.   
There is also no such thing as real-time information, 
near real-time maybe, but not real-time information except 
for those front-line commanders making decisions from the 
trenches.  Situational awareness is based on recent events, 
but can’t address events occurring now.  Anticipating 
events and speculation accuracy improve with credibility of 
information and an experienced commander who relies on his 
intellect to incorporate these concepts into his decisions.  
A commander’s confidence in what he thinks he knows plays a 
role in types of operational decisions.  One who is 
confident is more likely to make bolder decisions than one 
who questions the information he incorporates into his view 
of the situation. 
Now consider the informational decisions of a 
commander in an organization that has flattened the 
hierarchy and increased information flow via technology.  A 
small operation with few units involved will present the 
same issues as described above, but a large operation with 
many units complicates the informational decisions a 
commander will face.  An intuitive approach would almost 
certainly be used, but will the commander be able to 
identify the relative variables?  One possible solution 
would be analogous to how we view Monday Night Football.  
Producers behind the scenes see ten or twelve screens from 
various cameras viewing the game.  The Executive Producer 
decides what we get to see.  It is possible that a 
commander could use the same techniques, but this seems to 
counter the purpose of a networked organization as people 
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would still be filtering and modifying information before 
the commander gets to see it.  This leads to several other 
important topics such as experience and training of those 
individuals behind the scenes, which will be addressed 
later in the thesis.   
Recognizing that most individuals are capable of 
dealing with approximately seven pieces of data, plus or 
minus two, information overload remains an issue for almost 
any operation in which the commander is working to gain 
situational awareness.  Credibility of information remains 
an issue for the commander as well.  Trusting the selection 
of the key variables or the critical battle to technology 
or staff may not be the prudent course.  An Enhance Combat 
Operation Center experiment conducted several years ago at 
the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine 
Palms, CA illustrates this point.   
Two officers, one new O-3 and one two-star flag 
officer, from combat arms specialties were evaluated on 
their ability to obtain situational awareness in two 
different types of combat operation centers.  One was 
entirely digital with tracks of forces being collected and 
collated behind the scenes with relevant information being 
presented on elaborate screen in the Combat Operation 
Center (COC).  The other consisted of map boards, grease 
pencils, and lots of voice communications over traditional 
communication paths, not unlike the way we have been doing 
business for decades.  In the digital COC the youthful O-3 
outpaced the flag officer on all measureable aspects of the 
experiment.  He quickly gained situational awareness of the 
operating environment and did not hesitate to make 
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decisions based on what he believed was happening.  The 
flag officer, on the other hand, did not gain situational 
awareness near as quickly, and his decisions were 
calculated and slow as he insisted on additional 
information almost constantly.  He was not confident in the 
information he was presented and sought confirmation 
through other means. 
The traditional COC produced almost the opposite 
effect.  The two-star officer almost immediately had 
situational awareness and keyed in on critical information 
requirements that had most observers in awe as he diagnosed 
the problem he faced, and quickly made decisions that 
proved to be correct.  When asked how he knew what 
situation to key in on, he responded that “the inflection 
in people’s voices over the radio’s and his own experience” 
had guided him towards situations that needed his immediate 
attention.  The O-3 performed much the way the two-star had 
in the enhanced COC.  His responses were slow and sluggish, 
lacking confidence and requiring almost constant 
confirmation of what he believed was happening. 
This rather lengthy illustration identifies some 
critical items that we need to pay attention to as we 
pursue organizational change.  First, we must adopt a 
crawl, walk, run approach to develop the confidence and 
experience with the technology to keep us effective.  
Second, we must not abandon our current and proven 
techniques for commanding, as they have served us well in 




3. Operational Decisions 
In our way of thinking, the “rubber meets the road” 
with operational decisions.  Understanding now, how 
organizational and informational decisions affect 
operational decisions, we can better understand the issues 
concerned with which course of action to take.  In deciding 
how to proceed to accomplish the mission, the commander 
considers his objectives, enemy options, outer limit of his 
rules of engagement, and his level of confidence regarding 
situational awareness, all in the face of uncertainties 
about the future.  It is easy to understand, based on the 
analysis above, why operational decisions are considered an 
art.  When deciding on what course of action to pursue a 
commander considers whether it is suitable in 
accomplishment of the mission, feasible in accomplishing it 
with available resources and in the face of opposition 
expected, and acceptable if its cost does not exceed the 
value of the objective gained. (Snyder, p. 58 & 61) 
The competence of a commander is tested by operational 
decisions, and as previously stated, it is not the 
mechanisms or procedures he uses, but the end results in 
accomplishment of the mission that count. All previous 
decisions contribute to the success or failure of a 
commander, but it is the operational decisions that we 
consider most important in time of war.  Based on what we 
have covered, one must ask if this is a fair measure with 
which to evaluate commanders?  
As we move forward in our tactics and techniques to 
leverage the technology, the implications of information 
have to be considered.  What will be the mechanisms that 
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keep one front-line commander from acting on information 
more relevant to another?  In theory, tactical commanders 
will have access to the same information available at the 
strategic level and could make operational decisions with 
strategic implications.  Controlling this may require very 
defined missions that offer very little flexibility to the 
tactical commander.  The opposite scenario also exists.  A 
tactical commander often uses intuitive decision-making in 
the prosecution of objectives and mission.  In doing so, he 
may not be able to take advantage of the information 
available, which could also have implications well above 
his level.  Change is not easy and the solutions to these 
challenges must come from within if we are ever to realize 
our future visions.  Operational decisions largely 
determine our effectiveness and our organizational and 
informational decisions must support the efforts of those 
charged with making the “up-close and personal” operational 
decisions as we prepare for the future. 
 
F. SUMMARY 
 This chapter of the thesis addresses the heart of the 
command and control process, decision-making.  Analytical 
and intuitive approaches, or some combination thereof, are 
used in making organizational, information, and operational 
decisions.  It is not hard to understand how organizational 
decisions affect information flow and ultimately, 
operational decisions.  The challenge for those of us who 
participate in the processes is to understand where our 
military is headed, think about the C2 challenges we will 
face, and contribute to what needs to be a methodical 
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approach to solving these challenges.  They are, in fact 
challenges, as the talent we maintain amongst our ranks is 
phenomenal, and can overcome most any obstacle given the 
right resources.  Perhaps just educating our peers, 
seniors, and subordinates is the first step.    
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 VI. BUILDING EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The previous discussions make reference to “effective” 
command and control.  Having an effective process, in 
pursuit of mission accomplishment, enables decision-makers 
to build situational awareness in the face of uncertainty 
and time constraints as they decide what course of action 
to pursue.  Effective C2 depends on the capabilities of the 
people in the process, they are the most important 
dimension.  It is the people who are the basis of military 
organizations, and all operations that occur require human 
interactions of some sort.  The systems exist only to serve 
the people in the process, but they do not eliminate or 
lessen the role of humans.  As our reliance on technology 
increases and information is made available to the lowest 
level, it is the people who will use their cognitive skills 
to overcome some of the obstacles we have mentioned.  
People are the key to continued superiority. 
 The uncertainty and disorder of combat requires that 
we capitalize on the unique human abilities of initiative, 
boldness, creativity, judgment and strength to gain and 
maintain the advantage.  The commander is largely 
responsible for creating an atmosphere that recognizes, 
fosters, and seeks these qualities, which are essential to 
seize and exploit opportunities to maintain the combat 
advantage.  Recognizing that people are the key to the 
process, it is the commander who is the lynchpin of 
building effective command and control.  It is the people, 
not the technology, that are the key to building an 
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effective process and maintaining superiority.  
Understanding how to develop effectiveness in people begins 
with the commander. 
 
B. THE COMMANDER 
 The commander provides the art of command and combines 
it with the science of control to achieve desired results.  
Command resides exclusively with the commander and consists 
of authority, decision-making, and leadership.  Control is 
how the commander executes command.  His abilities, based 
on numerous variables, largely determine how effective the 
commander is in his endeavors.    Subordinates’ performance 
unquestionably contributes to effectiveness, but their 
abilities are significantly influenced by the commander, in 
his understanding of the situation, his communication 
techniques, and his adeptness in directing their actions to 
achieve desired results.  Effectiveness is a function of 
human performance in the commander and those involved in 
the C2 process.  The abilities of the humans in the process 
to apply the science and artfully orchestrate effective 
outcomes, determines how the mission is accomplished.  
Creating a positive command climate helps develop the 
effect we seek in the process, people, and outcomes.  This 
begins with the commander's ability to understand his 
people and organization as well as the operating 
environment, as a result of information gathering.      
 
1. Situational Awareness 
Situational awareness is attainable through the 
integration of information received from human and 
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technological collectors. Looking inward, a commander has 
to know the capabilities of the units, and more importantly 
the people.  In processing data about the enemy, terrain, 
troops, weather, and political climate from the operating 
environment, the commander builds an understanding of the 
events that have recently taken place as he attempts to 
influence future events.  Speed, reliability of 
information, level of stress, the way in which the 
information is presented, experience, and cognitive skills 
all play a factor in his ability to assimilate and compile 
the information.  Staff synchronization and the commander’s 
utilization of their skills also contributes.  
Incorporating these factors, the commander attempts to 
visualize what is happening.  Visualization is the core 
mental process that allows a commander to know when, where, 
and if to make a decision.   
  Conflicting information or misinterpretation caused 
by any of the factors being out of step contributes to the 
fog of war and can have devastating effects as evidenced by 
military history, which is replete with examples.  
Overcoming the fog in developing situational awareness 
might be the true test of the art of command and might be 
accomplished through: 
• Incremental decisions or conclusions until other 
techniques, such as gathering more information, 
have resolved the fog 
• Contingency plans in place to mitigate 
assumptions proving invalid, analysis proving 
faulty, or initial decision incorrect 
• Flexibility incorporated into the plan 
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Commanders make decision based on what they believe is 
happening and the visual image they develop will determine 
what decisions are made.  Too much information can be as 
crippling as too little in one’s attempt to develop good 
“SA.”  Uncertainty about what is happening can arise from 
unreliable or untimely information.  The fog this creates 
can be resolved by collecting more information, although 
time and other resources become a factor with this 
approach, or through the use of mission-oriented C2. 
 
C. MISSION-ORIENTED COMMAND 
Mission-oriented command relies on the use of mission 
tactics in which seniors assign missions and explain the 
underlying intent but leave subordinates as free as 
possible to choose the manner of accomplishment. (MCDP 6, 
p. 109) The alternative is a detailed C2 approach, which 
almost certainly breeds micro-management and slower 
decision-making.  Figure 8 dissects these approaches and 
highlights differences. 
Figure 8.   Mission vs Detailed C2 (from FM 6-0, p. 1-14) 
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Through a shared vision, focused on the objective, 
mission-oriented military operations can be achieved using 
decentralized execution.  It directly addresses the issues 
of uncertainty and time, generated by the fog of war, in a 
number of ways.  It reduces the amount of certainty needed 
for subordinates to act, as this is guided through the 
articulated intent, mission type orders, and shared vision.  
Once engaged, it utilizes implicit communications, keeping 
orders and plans as brief as possible.  These serve to 
decentralize decision-making, which increases the tempo and 
improves the force’s ability to deal with fluid and 
disorderly situations.  Mission-oriented command and 
control begins with commander’s intent. 
 
1. Commander’s Intent 
Commander’s intent is a mechanism that describes what 
is important through a common vision, articulated through a 
concise statement of what the force must do and the 
conditions the force must meet to succeed.  In short, it 
describes the desired end-state and the general path to get 
there.  It should pull the various separate actions of the 
force together, establishing and underlying purpose and 
focus.  It should provide the guidelines, constraints, 
restraints and the logic that allows subordinates to act 
according to their own unique circumstances while 
maintaining harmony with one another while keeping focus on 
the commander’s goals and objectives.  
Communications must be encouraged among, and with 
staff, peers, and subordinates.  Intentions are only may 
clear when they are presented in such a way that 
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subordinates fully understand all relevant points.  
Although communications can be written or verbal, face-to-
face communications are the most effective means because we 
use more than words to communicate.  A quote from an 
Israeli Commander during the six day war of 1967 adds 
clarification to this point. 
There is no alternative to looking into a 
subordinate’s eyes, listening to his tone of 
voice, and observing his behavior when issuing 
orders. (FM 6-0, p.  ) 
 
2. Mutual Trust 
Mutual trust must exist between all the elements of an 
organization using mission-oriented C2.  Trust among 
commanders, staffs, and individuals gives rise to 
cooperation, coordination, and confidence. Decentralized 
operations demand trust and mutual understanding because 
they are critical to tempo. As confidence in the abilities 
and judgment of subordinates, peers, and seniors increases 
so does the effectiveness of the process, which serves to 
free the commander.  Trust is something that must be earned 
as well as given.  This is done by developing a sense of 
responsibility, loyalty, and self-discipline amongst the 
organizational elements through training like they plan on 
fighting.   
Training of staffs and subordinates is not something 
that should be an issue after crossing the line of 
departure.  Warfighting skills are perishable and 
operational units have to be tactically and technically 
proficient.  Systems require operators, but commanders must 
also be aware of strengths and weaknesses and how best to 
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leverage the technology.  Subordinate commanders, in 
developing their own situational awareness, need to 
understand the operations two levels up, and these skills 
can be honed through a comprehensive training approach.  
Demonstrated confidence and trust grows as a “team” 
solidifies through training.  Trust also improves morale as 
individuals begin to identify with the group and its goals. 
(FM 6-0, p.4-20) 
 
3. Subordinate Initiative 
Allowing subordinates to seek out and exploit rapidly 
fleeting opportunities in pursuit of the mission serves to 
offset some of the uncertainty faced by the commander. 
Initiative requires decisions and actions.  Subordinates 
must decide and initiate independent action to overcome 
unanticipated obstacles or seize targets of opportunity 
while operating within the scope of the commander’s intent.  
Initiative places special burdens on subordinates, who must 
always keep the larger situation in mind.  It also places 
burdens on superiors who must delegate responsibility for 
such actions.  Delegating the authority to subordinates 
does not absolve higher commanders of ultimate 
responsibility.  Relying on subordinate initiative to 
overcome some of the uncertainty, a commander must trust 
his subordinates and clearly articulate his intent to those 
he expects to capitalize on opportunities.  This also 
becomes easier as cohesiveness is formed through training 
and an operational climate that promotes calculated, 
disciplined risk-taking, which is much different than 
gambling.   
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In assessing subordinates, commanders who adopt a 
coach and mentor approach when training have the 
opportunity to study the personality and characteristics of 
staff and subordinates.  Understanding the intellect, 
common sense, proficiency, and ability to deal with stress 
of those being evaluated helps the commander gauge 
capabilities and provides some insight into their 
initiative and boldness.  Capitalizing on strengths and 
weakness of members of the organization is a tool 
commanders use to attack problems, formulate decisions, and 
create a positive C2 environment. As a result, trust 
develops and the organization becomes more effective.  
Risk associated with decision-making is acceptable 
when armed with enough information to visualize the outcome 
in terms of mission accomplishment or damage to one’s 
force. (FM 6-0, p. 2-21)  Subordinate initiative builds 
confidence and pride in individual abilities positively 
effecting unit morale and overall effectiveness. 
     Effective command and control is really about the 
people involved in the process and organization.  A unit 
with inferior technology but abundant determination will 
always defeat the most technologically superior adversary 
with little determination.  The determination of which we 
speak is in large part due to the command climate of the 
unit.  It would be easy and accurate to categorize the 
previous items as a function of leadership and the 
responsibility of the commander.  Many have been touched 
upon in previous sections and are factors we would consider 
just good common sense, but they bear repeating because 
they are crucial in setting the tone in which the people in 
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the process have to operate.  It is the people who make the 
organization and process effective. 
 
D. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT 
 Information is the most important component of control 
as commander’s decisions, dissemination of orders, and the 
monitoring and supervision of activities all require 
information.  Information drives how the commander 
visualizes what is taking place in the battlespace, but if 
improperly managed, it may do nothing to assist the 
decision-maker.  It is the management of the information 
that provides the mechanism to use it to create effective 
command and control.  Information management serves to 
narrow the gap between the information the commander needs 
and that, which is available to him.   The management of 
information should facilitate the rapid, distributed, and 
unconstrained flow of information in all directions to 
better balance decision-making at all levels. 
 It should be presented, to the extent possible, in a 
visual or image based format for ease of comprehension.  
Decision-makers do not have the luxury of sifting through 
masses of data to develop the information they need to 
orient, decide, and act.  It should also discriminate as to 
importance, quality and timeliness as it is intended to 
enhance the ability of commanders to communicate 
understanding, concept, and intent with clarity, intensity, 
and speed.  It should also focus on those critical 
information requirements, which directly affect his 
decisions.  What this requires is a means of aggregating, 
fusing and prioritizing.  Recall the Monday Night Football 
  77
analogy.  No single person can digest all the information 
generated with our tech-heavy structure.  Training of the 
people who will be charged with aggregating, fusing, and 
prioritizing will be a challenge that is discussed further 
in chapter VII.  As we consider organizational changes to 
meet future challenges by reducing echelons of command, we 
will still have to interpret, aggregate, and filter 
information.  As incoming information grows, it is not hard 
to envision adding more people to perform these functions.  
This would in essence, restore the delays the 
organizational shifts seek to eliminate, and slow the 
decision-making process reducing overall effectiveness.  An 
appreciation of the challenges we face with managing 
information stems from the type of information that will be 
processed. 
 
1. Categories of Information 
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Most military organizations categorize the types of 
information they use as critical, exceptional, or routine.  
Critical information directly affects the successful 
execution of the operations.  Commander’s Critical 
Information Requirements (CCIRs) include information that 
has direct bearing on the commander’s decisions.  These 
items are specified by the commander for each operation and 
apply to events or activities that are predictable.  CCIRs 
are time sensitive and can incur no delay when being 
relayed to the commander, staff and subordinate commanders.  
Determining the critical information helps the commander 
reduce the amount of information reported to him to those 
items that are urgent to mission accomplishment. (FM 6-0, 
p.I-1)  The answers provided by CCIRs might help the 
commander determine or validate a course of action by 
providing previously unknown information. 
Exceptional information is specific and immediately 
vital information that is neither published nor explicitly 
stated; rather, it must be recognized as vital by 
tactically and technically competent subordinates and 
staff.  The purpose of this information is to signal the 
occurrence of one or more unpredictable our extraordinary 
events, such as an unforeseen opportunity.  Exceptional 
information must be addressed immediately and there can no 
delays in transmission of it, or decisions required as a 
result of receiving it.  These types of information are 
applicable to both the friendly and enemy situations.  (FM 
6-0, p.I-2) 
Routine information is categorized by the standard, 
repetitive type that occurs daily as indicated by SOPs.  
Reports on personnel and equipment that is used within and 
between staffs requiring little commander involvement 
characterize these types of reports. They are used to 
prepare and verify estimates and help to identify and 
anticipate potential problem areas.  This type of 
information is not time-sensitive in terms of decision- 
making and is normally transmitted via predetermined 
formats and channels. 
 
2. Information Management Activities 
Information management consists of five activities: 
collecting, processing, storing, displaying, and 
disseminating information.  These activities fit within the 
construct of the C2 process and overlap in practice.  
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Collecting information resides within the information 
gathering process described previously and takes two basic 
forms: information push and information pull.  The 
information that is required routinely is pushed from the 
source to the user as it becomes available.  This “push” is 
multi-directional in nature among senior, subordinate, and 
lateral commands.  There are applications, especially in 
the intelligence community, where this information may be 
time sensitive, but for the most part it is not.  It also 
alleviates the problem of burdening subordinates from their 
operations and tasks with excessive requests for 
information.  Information push does not work well in 
obtaining information to meet unforeseen needs, especially 
those time-critical requirements. 
Information-pull is designed to react to needs for 
information as the user generates information requirements.  
The source provides information in response, and this too 
is should be a multidirectional approach.  It is intended 
to fill information demands quickly and efficiently and 
often utilizes a common database as a way to serve the 
needs.  Information not immediately available triggers the 
chain of command until it reaches the appropriate level for 
collecting data.  (FM 6-0, p. 3-12)  This approach helps to 
focus scarce resources on the critical information and 
exceptional information requirements that develop and only 
produces the information needed. 
The function of information management is spread 
across the spectrum of the current military organization.  
Intelligence gathers the data, communications provides the 
means for transmission, and the commander via operations 
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determines what information is required.  All units, 
echelons, and functions utilize the information produced, 
but where this function resides is a question most 
organizations are working through as we evolve 
technologically.  Information managers have been charged 
with figuring this out, but few aspire to fill these 
important billets.   
 
3. Information Manager 
Pulling the activities of information management 
together is the job of the Information Manager (IM).  This 
individual has a precarious job as it requires him to be 
able to understand requirements at his level, capabilities 
at levels above, below and adjacent, and understand how to 
fuse the information into a coherent and understandable 
format.  The information manager monitors the performance 
and responsibilities of individuals in processing 
information to support the operations and the flow that 
feeds the information systems.  He is required to collect, 
task, analyze and present the information in a timely 
manner. 
Although some designate the Executive Officer (XO) or 
second in command as the information manager, it is rapidly 
developing into a job that requires some specific skills 
that the XO may not have by default.  In planning, 
operating, and maintaining a system used to meet 
information requirements, the IM has to understand what 
information is needed by and from each functional area to 
develop the comprehensive look.  To accomplish this the IM 
must not only understand the commander’s intent and his 
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information requirements, he must be well versed in all the 
functional areas that he is pulling information from as he 
builds a common operational picture.  This is an extremely 
challenging job complicated by a seemingly endless infusion 
of technology.  Training of such an individual would take 
some time and could require organizational changes as well. 
Experience is the key to success in a billet of this 
nature.  The person assigned as the IM should have adequate 
time serving at that operating level to fully appreciate 
the intricacies and idiosyncrasies of the commander and the 
organization.  The IM must be well-rounded with respect to 
functional capabilities of the organization and have a 
solid understanding of the C2 systems.  How to accomplish 
this is another issue, but suffice it to say, one that we 
must address as the IM becomes more and more critical to 
our abilities to filter, aggregate, and disseminate 
information.  It is interesting to note that as we consider 
networked organizations and streamlined chains of command, 
we have created a billet, or staff, responsible for 
managing the very information we say is critical to all 
commanders in their decision-making.   
The job of the information manager will be more than 
just developing procedures and gathering requirements.  It 
is quickly developing into the executive producer, made 
reference to previously, who will be required to do many 
things and make his own decisions on what information to 
present, information that commanders will use in deciding 
what actions to take.  Savvy, aggressive, and smart are 
just a few of the attributes this individual will need to 
possess if he is to contribute to command and control 
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effectiveness.  Perhaps it is time to begin investing in 
efforts to develop and train the Information Manager.  
 
E. SUMMARY 
Building effective command and control is about the 
people in the process.  Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and 
Marines will ultimately make the decisions required in time 
of war regardless of the technology at their disposal.  The 
commander, the guidelines he sets, and the atmosphere he 
creates will largely determine how effective the C2 process 
will be.  Volumes of information will have to be 
considered, and our abilities to do this also contribute to 
effectiveness.  In striving to become more efficient we 
should consider people first, technology second, and the 
creation of a command climate that allows the first to 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 




VII. COMMAND AND CONTROL CHALLENGES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Each aspect of command and control brings unique 
challenges that exist today.  The uniqueness of people in 
the process and the organizations they work within have 
contributed, and will continue to contribute, to the 
challenges faced as we move toward a force designed with 
flexibility and effectiveness in mind.  To create such a 
force, DoD is planning to rely more than ever before on 
high technology C2 systems to leverage military assets as 
our vision is one of information superiority.  It is the 
current and future reliance on systems that presents the 
biggest challenge and in large part drives the challenges 
of the people and the organizations.   
C2 processes are being transformed by the new 
technologies of the information age.  Older systems built 
for stand-alone or single purposes must be matriculated to 
meet explicit requirements for interoperability, 
flexibility, and effectiveness.  To accomplish this, DoD 
has been increasingly capitalizing on information 
technologies for C2 systems.  (National Academy of Science, 
p.1)  The implications of a continued reliance on 
technology and the transformations imposed on the process 
can be understood, but few practitioners really understand 
the changes taking place.  Discussion on the 
interoperability and integration of systems, the 
information generated, and the characteristics needed in 





 Joint, flexible, coherent, and effective operations 
are key components of DoD’s vision that is predicated on 
the concept of information superiority, enabled and 
supported by a network of C2 systems.  Future U.S. military 
operations will inevitably involve elements from more than 
one service and possibly coalition forces.  The ability to 
fuse the capabilities and services of these elements into a 
effective unified military force will require operational 
interoperability of the forces involved and technical 
interoperability of the systems.  Achieving 
interoperability is inherently a distributed, horizontal 
challenge, which must be addressed in a largely vertical 
environment.  (NAS, Exec Summary, p. 5)  Interoperability 
must be built into the force structure across service and 
unit boundaries to ensure fast and effective responses. 
 Operational interoperability goes beyond systems and 
includes the people and procedures that interact on an end-
to-end basis.  It is accomplished through the use of 
standards, training, testing, configuration management, and 
training.  Operational interoperability encompasses the 
full spectrum of military operations.  Technical 
interoperability is required in today’s military to achieve 
the operational type.  Technical interoperability must be 
considered in a variety of contexts and scopes, even for a 
single mission.  Consider the following example of data 
requirements: 
• Gathered from various sources and compiled into a 
standardized format 
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• Exchanged between systems of a single 
organization 
• Exchanged between systems of different services 
over various architectures 
• Aggregated at some higher level command and 
control system to provide added value (NAS, 
Interoperability, p.4)   
The range of requirements for data flow and exchange even 
at the lowest level underscores the importance of 
interoperability in every system and at every echelon.  Add 
to this the integration of commercial technology with 
proprietary military systems as we embark on a networked 
force and one quickly understands the importance of the 
issue. 
 
1. The Importance and Difficulty 
Current doctrine and emerging concepts require 
interoperability, which is difficult to achieve, but 
critical if we are to enjoy continued success.  The 
development and maintenance of a common operational 
picture, achievable only through interoperability, provides 
the leverage to make faster decisions.  This ability can 
change the nature and tempo of the environment providing a 
major advantage to the forces enabled.  A lack of this 
capability slows the process.  Where interoperability is 
lacking, there is the likelihood that multiple systems are 
performing the same functions, or that information is being 
processed or manually entered several times.  (NAS, 
Interoperability, p.4)  Human initiative and ingenuity 
often overcome situations where interoperability is an 
issue, but it certainly comes with a cost, normally 
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measured in terms of speed and inefficiency.  The more 
people handling and interpreting the data, the more likely 
errors are introduced into the process.   
Non-traditional operations, multi-national 
involvement, and the emphasis on rapid force projection, 
task organized to accomplish that specific mission, mean 
that there will be less time to address interoperability 
problems.  The increasing size of the area of operations 
that have and will take place require coordinated 
employment of weapons and forces.  To accomplish this, data 
is increasingly being exchanged between sensors, shooters, 
and systems that previously operated in stand-alone mode.  
It is the ability of one system to use and share the 
products of another system that we intend.  Close air 
support, suppression of enemy air-defense, and deep-strike 
attacks are just a few of the examples that may require 
rapid response between various organizations in large 
battle spaces.  Interoperability is required to meet such 
operational requirements.     
This does not mean that universal interoperability is 
required as it is neither achievable nor necessary.  All 
information in all systems being seamlessly exchanged is 
not technically feasible given the rate of change in 
technology and mission.  Administrative systems do not have 
to exchange all information with weapon systems.  
Understanding the importance of interoperability, 
determining how much and what is required, and the 
appropriate allocation of resources to support desired 
level of interoperability is paramount.    
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The difficulty in achieving the desired levels of 
interoperability can be attributed to any number of 
challenges.  Some of the more common ones are highlighted 
here.  Operational units are concerned with the 
capabilities that exist today.  They plan, train, and 
execute to best leverage what have and what they know 
works, which often requires working around problems.  
Planners approach interoperability as something that must 
be designed into the system.  They view changes in the 
system as important whereas the operator is more concerned 
with changes in operational capability.  Planners approach 
doctrine and tactics by what is possible when a force is 
fully equipped, manned, and running.  The operators are 
driven by actual capabilities provided once a system is 
fielded.  These different views create some tension between 
immediate and future needs, which can fracture 
interoperability efforts.    
The inability to anticipate all relevant uses of the 
technology adds to the problem.  Many of the most common 
applications of information technology today were 
unanticipated when the technology was initially deployed.  
E-mail, once considered a secondary application, is now of 
the most used applications.  It is difficult to 
conceptualize how emerging technologies will be used in the 
future, a difficulty that is multiplied when operating in 
an uncertain environment. (NAS, Interoperability, p. 9)  
Not knowing how the technology will impact application 
development and the C2 process complicates the challenges of 
interoperability.   
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Legacy systems not designed to be easily integrated 
with current and future systems contribute to the challenge 
as well.  New systems must find a way to integrate these 
systems or add legacy functionality into future design.  
Integrating different legacy systems, developed in a 
stovepipe approach only serving parts of the organization, 
requires significant investment, and replacing them with 
more interoperable systems is not a short-term option.  The 
acquisition process is not currently able to keep pace with 
the advances in technology, resulting in short-term system 
development lagging behind the technology curve almost 
immediately.  Maybe our C2 systems should not be built on 
the latest technologies, but on proven architectures, 
systems, and infrastructure as the decisions made in our 
process and environment can endanger lives. 
Backward compatibility, the use of Commercial Off The 
Shelf (COTS) products with proprietary technologies, the 
inherent inadequacies of such products on issues such as 
security, the controlling of requirements creep and the 
need for synchronization of interdependent, but 
independently developed systems, also contribute to the 
challenge of interoperability.  But it is possible to close 
the gap on the interoperability challenges if we follow 
some general principles in our approach to technology and 
systems that were developed in the study by the National 
Academy of Sciences on Realizing the Potential of C4I  and 
are listed below.  
• The needs of the operational military commander 
must be the main driver of interoperability 
solutions and investments. 
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• While universal interoperability is neither 
necessary nor achievable, a high degree of it is 
needed to provide the flexibility for both 
anticipated mission needs and unanticipated 
operational deployments. 
• Interoperability must be balanced against other 
fundamental attributes of C2 systems, including 
security, availability, flexibility, 
survivability, and performance. 
• C2 interoperability requires a unifying framework 
and a body of definitive implementing guidance. 
• When developing architectures, use a small team. 
• Decompose the problem of achieving defense-wide 
interoperability into manageable pieces. 
• Assess interoperability on the basis of ongoing 
training and testing. 
• Measure progress toward interoperability goals. 
• Build a common defense-wide infrastructure to 
facilitate interoperability 
• Engineer flexibility by: 
• Using COTS products, services, and 
technology whenever possible. 
• Use standards. 
• Base architectures and system designs on 
layering and clean interfaces. 
• Make data self-describing to permit future 
interoperability. 
The issue of interoperability and the solutions to 
overcome the challenges associated with it are inherently 
distributed throughout DoD.  Therefore, in achieving 
interoperability, it will require responsibility and 
authority that crosses organizational boundaries; a 
requirement that implies the need for strong top-down 




Although some would argue that integration and 
interoperability are the same, it is a worthwhile exercise 
to consider the integration of the technologies into our C2 
process as a contributing factor to the interoperability 
challenge.  Richard Hayes, president of Evidence Based 
Research, illustrates this point well.  He argues that C2 is 
an adaptive control system that seeks to influence the 
operating environment, and it is supported by a variety of 
information systems.  Integration is embedding the 
information systems into the process.  He uses the 
following illustration to show the C2 process as it has been 










Figure 9.   Traditional C2 Process (from Hayes, p.2) 
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This supports our previous discussion in which it was 
pointed out that information systems, for the most part, 
are very specialized, developed to support a specific 
function such as intelligence or logistics.  They often 
served as just an aid to conduct the business of that 
function, but were rarely integrated into the processes. 
This has often made it hard for functional areas to share 
information and to understand the information available to 
different elements within the organization.  As a result, 
what often occurs is that each staff section uses their 
unique system to gather the information they need in 
support of the commander’s requirements.  They then, along 
with the other sections, put that information into some 
sort of standardized format for the commander’s use.  This 
can be in the form of written or verbal report, or as is 
often the case, powerpoint presentations.  The traditional 
C2 process is cyclical in nature and the information systems 
used to support it almost guarantee difficulties arising 
from disjoint decision cycles and information across time, 
space, and echelons. (Hayes, p. 2-5) 
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Today, information systems have grown in size and 
applicability, and we are starting to see command and 
control processes being hastened by improvements in the 
technology.  Processing power and bandwidth increases have 
enabled greater sharing of information across the spectrum.   
The increased utilization of systems has helped to pull the 
functions closer, increasing awareness and in many cases 
reducing uncertainty.  But for the most part they remain as 
tools to facilitate the process and not capabilities 
embedded in the process.  Information systems have 
penetrated deeply into each of the key functional areas, 
but their impact on doctrine, organizations, and tactics 
have been minimal.  (Hayes, p. 7)  We have started to 
consider these issues, and it is changes in these areas 
that will determine the success of initiatives such as 
network-centric warfare and the global information grid. 
The type of integration we seek requires that the 
information systems become embedded in the C2 processes.  
Simultaneous planning across echelons of command, all 
sharing the same information from the start, is the type of 
capability we seek in structures of the future.  Hayes 








   
  
Figure 10.   Integrated View (from Hayes, p.8) 
 
The integration we seek in a networked environment 
will occur over time, space, function, and echelon.  It 
will provide increased information, which should translate 
to better knowledge, and will be available to more 
organizations.  Some of the challenges associated with such 
a networked organization have already been discussed, but 
make no mistake: as we move towards this end-state, it will 
not be the technology and systems that we find difficult, 
but the changes in doctrine, organization, and training 
required to remain effective that will be the real 
challenge.   
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C. RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGY 
 To this point we have explored the many facets of 
command and control.  Technology has become an essential 
part of C2, but it involves more than architectures, 
systems, and gadgetry.  Efforts to improve command and 
control will fail if we focus exclusively on technical 
fixes as some people are now, and will continue to be the 
key to command and control.  The most advanced equipment 
does little good if people do not know how to use it.  
Commanders must recognize capabilities and limitations, and 
determine how to work around obstacles created by the 
technology.  We only have to look at some recent U.S. 
military calamities to see that in may cases our C2 
disasters occurred despite the presence of advanced 
technology.  Pearl Harbor, the Mayaguez incident and events 
involving the USS Stark and Vincennes demonstrate that 
state of the art technology was not enough to compensate 
for fallible human judgment. 
 
1. Avoiding Pitfalls  
 Heavy reliance on technology to improve the process or 
solve C2 problems has associated risks.  We have seen that 
it support every function of the process.  It serves to 
reduce uncertainty by providing more sensors, data, 
communication channels, and information, but it also 
increases uncertainty to the extent it’s vulnerable.  
Losing some of the capabilities provided by the technology 
can cause chaos as we have become so dependent on them.  We 
must be smart about how we utilize the technology and 
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suppress the temptation to put “all our eggs in one basket” 
as pointed out by the former director of national security 
communications to President Reagan, John Grimes. (Coakley, 
pp. 73-74) 
 Having enjoyed considerable technological superiority 
for an extensive period of time, we must guard against 
overconfidence.  Complete trust in system outputs, 
precision of instrumentation, and reliability is foolish 
behavior when we consider how little disturbance or 
friction it takes to disable or disrupt technology.  An 
adversary who relies on initiative and ingenuity and the 
‘fog of war’ is likely to have more impact on the delicate 
composition of chip-based weaponry and communication 
equipment than he ever could on a well-trained, fast-
thinking infantryman armed with a reliable carbine.   
 Given information on how to build a watch when one 
just wanted to know what time it is, highlights some 
potential problems brought on by the information age in the 
form of information overload.  Having, the most data is not 
necessarily a key component of victory, whereas having the 
right piece of data might be.  Finding the critical piece 
of data, in the mountains of information, to help the 
decision-maker will be the challenge we face as we steam 
forward into the information age.  This challenge can be 
reduced through the use of filters and fusion, but these 
techniques are not without hurdles.  The potential for 
manipulations exist whenever a decision-maker tolerates the 
intervention of a filter between himself and the raw data, 
regardless of whether the filtering system is human or 
machine. (Coakley, p. 79)  This can result in 
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inconsistencies, which otherwise may alert the decision-
maker, being dropped or averaged out.  Information overload 
is a problem at all levels.  The technology must be 
incorporated into systems that allow commanders to analyze 
the data they need without devoting all of their time to 
this endeavor.  Networked organizations and uncertain 
futures will challenge our abilities to command and 
control. 
 Illusions of timely and accurate information were 
addressed previously, but the fact that commanders depend 
on information that, to a great extent, has been collected 
and analyzed electronically, should make us mindful of the 
need to incorporate other non-digital resources in the 
formulation of our situational awareness.  Vulnerabilities 
associated with complete reliance on technology such as 
power disturbances, intended or unintended data corruption, 
and security issues behoove this approach.  This approach 
also keeps decision-makers from becoming blinded by the 
technology.  There are numerous issues that must be 
analyzed in the decision-making process. The number of 
issues increases with each subsequent level of command.  
The operating environment is full of these variables, all 
of which cannot be captured by the technology.  Commanders 
must restrain from developing narrowed visions based solely 
on the digital products they receive, as the other sources 
of information may be equally important.  It is also 
important to note that no technology or system, developed 
by humans, is completely flawless.  For this reason alone, 
there should always be an element of uncertainty that we 
consider as our reliance on automation increases. 
  97
 
2. Recommended Approach    
 It is human savvy, tenacity, initiative, and ingenuity 
that have, and will continue, to make the difference on the 
battlefield.  Technology can never replace the flexibility 
and common sense that can transcend the realm of logic, 
which only we can contribute.  Technology has its 
vulnerabilities, as do humans, and we must work towards the 
development of systems that capitalize on the minds ability 
to explore options and possibilities that would never occur 
to the computer.  Training with the same technology we will 
use to fight is the mechanism that will facilitate the 
desired end-state.  Variation of training scenarios should 
be incorporated when possible to point out the support that 
sophisticated C2 systems can provide.  This applies to 
system development efforts as well.  Imagine the 
possibilities if units allocated training time for the 
purpose of supporting system development efforts throughout 
the entire development process.  Current operation tempos 
may prohibit this, but as we place more and more reliance 
on technology, this may be a way to ensure that operational 
requirements are identified and met in systems being 
developed.  An argument could be made that the investment 
of such an endeavor would pay much larger dividends than 
current practices.  Likewise, we must also train to 
function independently of high-tech equipment when 
necessary.  
 The Secretary of the Navy, Gordon England, pointed out 
during a speech to the students at NPS that the current 
training approach works today only because our acquisition 
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process can not keep pace with technology cycles.  That is 
certainly true, but the training today has unique 
challenges, that if addressed, will greatly enhance the 
time to develop a functional force as we introduce new 
technologies and systems.  It appears that the formal 
schools throughout DoD are disconnected from the 
development commands.  One reason for this is because 
documentation on systems, whether the use COTS technology 
or not, usually is the last deliverable item in the 
contract.  Systems are being fielded prior to the training 
to support the systems entering formal schools.  Mobile 
training teams and contract support attempt to address this 
shortcoming, but it still leaves a considerable void in 
capability and utilization.  Training commands can go years 
before conducting reviews, and when they are done, they 
look to the fleet as the primary input mechanism.  Perhaps 
some closer coordination with the development commands is 
warranted.  Development efforts need input from the 
schoolhouses from an early start.  People educated in the 
business of training would provide valuable insight to 
project managers and contractors on their training 
resources development efforts.  A phased timing approach 
would enhance initial capability when systems are deployed 
if members of the fleet knew the systems before they were 
fielded.  Integrating the schoolhouses into the development 
process is called for to improve current development 
efforts and in preparation for future endeavors.    
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 Technology will continue to influence the way we 
organize, operate, and fight.  It is the humans in the 
process that will remain the key components in 
accomplishing the mission.  The future calls for an 
integrated approach where the best capabilities from both 
are emphasized and developed with flexibility in mind to 
meet current and future needs.  Full utilization of the 
technologies being developed and implemented will require 
some new approaches to training in order to accomplish 
this. 
             
D. MANAGING CHANGE 
 Consider our current state within DoD and our visions 
of the future as outlined in such documents as Joint Vision 
2010 and Network-centric Warfare (NCW).  Technology-driven 
transformation is being called for that will require some 
institutional changes to be successful.  Revolutions do not 
occur smoothly, nor do they succeed without significant 
breakage on many fronts.  They are even more difficult when 
the institutions are steeped in proud histories and imbued 
with strong cultures.  And, in the absence of an immediate 
crisis facing them, institutions are particularly 
challenged to transform themselves.  (NAS, Chapter 4, p. 1) 
 There exist some generally accepted and effective 
principles for managing change that have been learned from 
revolutions currently taking place in commercial sectors.  
Although the military situation is quite different, they 
can serve as a roadmap when change is required.  The first 
of these is a clear and consistent vision for the future.  
Senior leaders must set the vision and in doing so must be 
aware of the capabilities of the technology.  They must 
also provide the resources to test, develop, and train with 
emerging technology and an acquisition system that does not 
hamper these efforts.   
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 Change also requires persistent leadership and a sense 
of urgency.  Assignments in the military are relatively 
short when compared to the time needed to effect major 
cultural changes.  Driving visionaries are needed at the 
highest levels, and though these individuals exist, they 
are rarely in the billets long enough to see a major 
undertaking through to completion.  One of the reasons that 
the natural tendency of the military is to resist change, 
is because of our short tenures in assignments.  Keeping 
the right people in the right job has proven successful.  
Admiral Rickover’s vision and drive with respect to a 
nuclear Navy and Rear Admiral Wayne Meyer’s oversight of 
the AEGIS combat system for some 14 years are just two 
examples.   
 The willingness and commitment to reengineer any 
process, doctrine, or organization to achieve desired 
capabilities is another key to succeeding.  In doing so, we 
must accept some risk as we try to fully exploit the 
capabilities of the technology needed to get us to the 
desired state.  As previously stated, we must be willing to 
change the structure to make best use of the technology, 
vice trying to make the technology fit within a proven, but 
antiquated structure.  The military structure we have used 
for the last fifty years, despite evolutionary changes in 
technology, must change if we are to realize our visions. 
 The visions and technology do not get us headed in the 
right direction without a willingness to fund the changes 
and to reprioritize budget allocations.  Reprioritization 
of resources has not taken place.  With limited resources, 
we struggle between allocating dollars for weapons or 
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information systems.  Our incremental approach to budget 
programming contributes to this challenge as well.  This 
creates some tension between the historical quest of 
military leadership for traditional weapons modernization 
and the call for investments in “force multipliers” such as 
modern C2 systems. (NRC, p. 186)  Capturing the elusive 
force multiplier is a challenge in and of itself. 
 
E. FORCE MULTIPLICATION 
 The value of command and control systems is extremely 
difficult to assess.  Certainly they help the commander in 
“commanding and controlling”, usually assisting him in 
dissemination or communication of a shared image and coping 
with uncertainty and tempo in conflict.  But exactly how 
much do C2 systems contribute to success in warfare? 
(Bjorklund, p. 73).  These systems are also intended to 
improve the quality of decisions made by commanders.  As 
each decision-making process is unique to the human 
employing it, determining the value of system designed to 
support the human in this endeavor becomes problematic.  
 Measures of military effectiveness are a class of 
information that is used to make decisions about resource 
allocations and procurements.  They are variable of 
significance associated with the prevailing theory or 
doctrine of combat.  (NAS, p.213)  These variables, when 
evaluating C2 systems, are much harder to formulate and 
capture than with weapon systems that are almost entirely 
evaluated on quantitative data than can be used to do 
extensive comparative analysis.  Measures of effectiveness 
are tied to doctrinal approaches to operations.  C2 systems 
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often are geared towards new ways of doing business or new 
concepts and are difficult to evaluate with existing 
measures.  In the civilian sector, investments in 
technology are often made on the basis of instinct and 
judgment rather than analytical data, but in the military, 
where precious resources are scrutinized by a massive 
bureaucracy; allocation is granted largely on the 
measurable improvements they will contribute.    Developing 
measures that allow information systems to compete with 
weapons systems requires that we first determine what it is 
that needs to be measured and secondly, the best approach 
to accomplishing that. 
 
1. What to Measure 
There is an emerging industry, comprised mainly of 
those from the operations research field, that is tackling 
the issue of what to measure and how to determine 
effectiveness when evaluating C2 systems.  The National 
Academy of Science’s report on “Realizing the Potential of 
C4I” describes some measures that could be used to better 
understand the impact of C2 systems on military operation.  
The first group of measures addresses ongoing performance 
data that can be readily observed and tracked, such as:  
• Number of targets killed per unit time,  
• Number of targets killed divided by number of 
attempts to kill,  
• Number of targets put at risk per dollar invested 
in system capability,  
• Percentage of detected security penetrations 
thwarted per unit time,  
• Percentage of enemy attacks deflected,  
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• Delay in commander's visibility of major 
battlefield change,  
• Decision time-measured as the delay between 
visibility of information and initiation of 
action,  
• Reaction delay-measured as the time between 
decision to act and completion of action 
execution,  
• Number of different military units that can be 
connected to command when needed,  
• Time between target identification and weapon-on-
target,  
• Single-shot probability of kill using a given C4I 
system/weapon combination, and  
• Number of target engagements per unit time. 
Observations of aperiodic failures and tallying of 
root causes makes up the second category and include:  
• Mishaps due to friendly fire, and  
• Erroneous battlefield descriptions.  
Data obtained as a result of simulated tests is the 
last category identified and includes: 
• Time to react to a breach of security, and  
• Time to deploy troops in response to a specific 
threat (NAS, p.214) 
These measurements are not all encompassing and have 
caveats attached.  Any measurement of effectiveness can 
inform, but not substitute for the judgment of senior 
military leaders.  Overreliance on comprehensive 
quantitative data is likely to delay the changes necessary 
to exploit the benefits of C2 technology, because 
development of such evidence is often time consuming.  The 
measures may help capture the contributions of C2 systems to 
  104
outcomes, but identifying the precise contributions of the 
systems is hard.  Measurement criteria should apply to any 
systems development effort.  When special criteria are used 
for C2 systems interpreting the data becomes difficult when 
comparing it against other metrics, and we run the risk of 
engineering the metrics to support or defend a particular C2 
system.  Command and control systems designed to meet 
certain needs may have applicability that reaches far 
beyond the intended need.  GPS in an example of an 
infrastructure technology that weapons systems have come to 
rely upon.  Initial need measurements will not capture the 
effectiveness when used in a broader scope.  The metrics 
identified above do not really address how the system helps 
human judgment as they endeavor to make decisions and this 
remains the crux of the challenge. (NAS, p.215) 
 
2. How to Measure 
Once the metrics and measures of military 
effectiveness are developed, capturing the data presents 
itself as the next hurdle.  More and more stock has been 
placed in computer modeling and simulations as a way to 
investigate the worth of new concepts and technologies.  
They can certainly produce useful information, but it can 
be less than adequate as the information obtained in a 
simulation is not particularly vivid or memorable.  Data in 
the form of printouts and static graphics do not have the 
emotional impact of live demonstrations.  The models 
underlying a simulation are based on an accepted 
understanding of the problem at hand and the relationship 
to current doctrine and tactics.  Not properly identifying 
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the problem, which is a challenge in and of itself, leads 
to poor simulations and evaluations.  This approach is not 
conducive to demonstration of how a radically new doctrine 
enabled by C2 technology can lead to dramatically new 
results.  Model fidelity can almost always be challenged 
because they must make simplifying assumptions about the 
nature of combat.  It is just not possible to capture all 
the variables in a model.  If C4I systems are intended to 
help decision-making, the models or simulations used must 
include decision-making.  This is extremely difficult to 
accomplish, as we do not have good models of human 
decision-making.   This leaves the door open to opponents 
of the development effort.  (NAS, p.223) 
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Live experiments are an alternative approach to 
explore the use and value of C2 systems.  They have the 
virtue of greater realism and enable the examination of 
larger excursions from present doctrine and organization 
than is possible with simulations.  Evaluating human 
factors working under stressful conditions, and the 
immediate feedback available to evaluators allows these 
excursions.  Experiments can help uncover integration and 
interoperability problems and provide valuable training on 
how to incorporate systems into the processes.  
Unfortunately, live experiments are expensive to conduct on 
a large scale, and so they usually only explore small 
deviations from the accepted wisdom that will not provide 
the payoff larger deviations would.  Small experiments do 
not provide the insight on the value of C2 applications that 
cut across systems, echelons, functions, and services.  
Small-scale settings are often the only option when 
conducting experiments due to cost.  As a result, small 
samples reduce the ability to control variables, and a 
large number of degrees of freedom make rigorous 
conclusions a problem.  Live experiments attract much 
public attention, and any failures perceived can quickly 
lead to loss of support.  The incentive to develop tough 
tests, to fully evaluate a system is lost for fear of 
dwindling support.  (NAS, p.211)  Small-scale experiments, 
that individually take considerable amount of time to plan 
for and execute, slow the evaluation process.  This 
approach could find the technology being evaluated obsolete 
before all experiments have been conducted. 
Force multiplication metrics based on the C2 system 
contributions continue to be researched and developed.  The 
fiscal realities of the military make it difficult to adopt 
the intuitive approach to systems integration as is often 
done in the commercial sector.  Development of the metrics 
and the measurement techniques discussed here are only part 
of the puzzle.  Senior leaders and resource oversight 
members must be educated on the challenges of C2 system 
evaluations and consider these when deciding where to best 
spend the limited dollars.   
 
F. SUMMARY 
 One may interpret this section as the chicken-little 
view of command and control.  It is not intended to send 
the message that the ‘sky is falling,’ but rather to expose 
the reader to the issues that we cumulatively must consider 
and address.  It is hard to ask the right questions or 
embark on a plan that allows us to realize future DoD 
vision if one does not understand the challenges.  The 
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people, information, and structure of the C2 process share a 
unique relationship.  Changes to any one component have 
effects on the others and this is why we must invest in 
understanding how the function of command is implemented by 























Command and control is broadly defined and often 
misunderstood.  Every facet of the military contributes to 
the process, and the process affects everything associated 
with the military entity in turn.  It is a complicated, yet 
fascinating topic that requires exploration throughout 
one’s tenure in uniform.  Because of its scope, identifying 
and understanding the fundamentals would seem a logical 
first step.  Although there are endless amounts of 
information on the subject, few readings or presentations 
are geared toward an introductory course.  The intent of 
this thesis is to provide such a resource that is geared 
toward mid-grade officers with some experience at the 
tactical level in hopes of exposing them to the 
fundamentals, the issues associated with C2, and the 
considerations needed as we continue down the information-
age warfare corridor. 
The principles of C2, as defined in current doctrine and 
by recognized authorities on the subject, provide the 
underpinnings for defining the command and control process 
and the components thereof.  The people, information, and 
structure of the process are the central themes discussed 
throughout the thesis.  Organization drives behavior, and 
an exploration of the current military organization against 
those needed to achieve DoD’s vision of future capabilities 
highlight the changes required to accomplish this.  
Decisions about the organization influence the other 
decisions made by a commander, namely informational and 
operational.  Understanding the relationship between these 
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types of decisions and how a commander makes them gives the 
reader some insight as to why decisions are the heart of 
the C2 process.  Effective command and control is largely a 
function of the humans in the process.  People have, and 
will continue to, make the difference in warfare.  
Developing an environment that capitalizes on the strengths 
of the components while compensating for the weaknesses 
helps ensure we are effective.  The challenges associated 
with command and control serve as a mechanism to prepare us 
for the future.  These challenges are largely based on the 
technologies emerging and the considerations required to 
integrate these into our process as we seek 
interoperability across the spectrum.   
Command and control is not limited to technicians or 
commanders.  It is something that each of us influences and 
is involved in from the time we enter the military to our 
last day of service.  Recognizing its importance is easily 
done, but understanding why it is important is the question 
we should be asking and the focus of this research.  It is 
our ability to build effective command and control that 
will sustain us in an uncertain future.       
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APPENDIX A – READINGS 
 The readings associated with this thesis are on CD-ROM 
which is held by the C3 academic Group.  Copies can be 


















APPENDIX B – SLIDES 
 The slides associated with the research material are 
on CD-ROM which is held by the C3 academic Group.  Copies 
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